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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the steps taken by the German Federal
Government to transform the character of German security
policy from the customs of forward defense on the inner-
German border to the strategic realities of the present.
While this author believes quite firmly that the time is
drawing near when German soldiers will participate in combat
within the framework of collective defense and security in a
future conflict, considerable obstacles to such a
contingency remain. The study interprets the interaction of
the elements of government, the military, political parties
and the international system in the transformation of German
defense policy since the shock of the Post-Cold War world
has overwhelmed Atlantic security institutions. This thesis
describes the strategic interaction of how Germany's
political leaders have adjusted themselves to an unfamiliar
and uncomfortable world of war and peace. In the process,
Germany is discarding the security policy of so-called
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, western European
security policy has undergone a radical transformation.
Western European countries are grappling with a new
international security environment that is less clear that
during the former bipolar balance of power era. The western
European democracies are faced with changing their national
security policies to reflect and keep pace with the
transformation in the Post-Cold War world. The central
issue of participation in military operations outside one's
borders affects the Federal Republic of Germany in a vastly
different context based primarily on Germany's past, than
the older, yet equally stable democracies. This study
analyzes the steps taken by the German Federal Government to
transform the character of German security policy from the
customs of forward defense on the inner-German border to the
strategic realities of the present.
The Persian Gulf War became the watershed event in the
debate over united Germany's use of military force outside
of accepted constitutional, let alone historical and
geographical, parameters. The out-of-area issue raised
vi
during the Persian Gulf War reflects a more complex question
of German national identity in the Post-Cold War world. The
German debate over military missions initially has focused
on "Blue Helmet" peacekeeping operations within regional and
global collective security organizations. The debate
further developed toward the potential for combat missions.
This study is important because Germany's politicians are at
a crossroads. While this author believes quite firmly that
the time is drawing near when German soldiers will
participate in combat within the framework of collective
defense and security in a future conflict, considerable
obstacles to such a contingency remain.
This thesis highlights the historical perspective
concerning the development of Germany's national identity
and its impact upon the formulation of national security
policy. The study interprets the interaction of the
elements of government, the military, political parties and
the international system in the transformation of German
defense policy since the shock of the Post-Cold War world
has overwhelmed Atlantic security institutions. This thesis
describes the strategic interaction of how Germany's
political leaders have adjusted themselves to an unfamiliar
and uncomfortable world of war and peace. In the process,
vii
Germany is discarding the security policy of so-called
reticence
.
The strategic revolution of unification, the collapse of
Communism and the Soviet Union, and all that followed in the
Persian Gulf War, the Balkan crisis, Somalia and beyond has
cast all of the above into a cockeyed perspective. The
debate on peacekeeping missions has come to its first
parliamentary vote with less than optimal results. The
political gridlock over the divisive issue has not been
resolved. The Kohl government's attempts to re-formulate
national security and foreign policy have met with mixed
results both at home and abroad. Yet, it is clear to all of
the Germany's political leadership that the front-line
defense policy has become obsolete in a changing
international security environment.
However, the new policy that will finally replace it
remains unclear as Europe and Germany struggle with the
primacy of domestic politics, the stalling of efforts at
international union, and the return of war to Europe. This
thesis attests to this reality and its author looks forward
hopefully to a time when a democratic Germany can assume its




Twenty-six year old Alexander Arndt, a Sergeant assigned
to a German military medical unit, was in the fourth month
of his deployment outside of Germany. In two weeks time at
the end of his unit's mission, Sergeant Arndt was to rotate
back to the Fatherland. Undoubtedly, like many German
soldiers before him who also were near the end of an arduous
and potentially dangerous tour, his thoughts included
returning to loved ones and enjoying the simple pleasures in
life such as a home-cooked meal. Unfortunately, Sgt. Arndt
would never step foot into Germany again as he became
another casualty in the 19 month-long operation.
Enroute back to his unit, after eating dinner in the
capitol city, he was shot to death while driving his truck.
The story of his death is not one of the millions of tragic
tales to come out of the 1916 Somme Offensive or even the
blitzkreig of Poland in 1939, but was unique in that
Sgt. Arndt was the first German soldier killed overseas
since the end of the Second World War. Sgt. Arndt was
killed on 14 October 1993 while serving in the
UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. Although the mission
was humanitarian by nature, his death once again focused
attention on the German military and its proper role in
German foreign and security policy in a changing
international environment. 1
This thesis describes the steps taken by the German
Federal Government to transform the character of German
security policy from the customs of forward defense on the
inner-German border to the strategic realities of the
present. While this author believes quite firmly that the
time is drawing nearer that German soldiers will participate
in combat within the framework of collective defense and
security in a future conflict, considerable obstacles to
such a contingency remain. The present study interprets the
interaction of the elements of the Federal Government, the
German military institution, the major political parties and
the international system of states in the transformation of
German defense policy since the shock of events in the Post-
Cold War world has overwhelmed the Atlantic security
institutions. This thesis thus describes the strategic
interaction of how Germans, particularly in the cabinet and
lM German Soldier Becomes the First Casualty of German
Involvement in UN Missions," The Week in Germany , (New York:
German Information Center, 22 October 1993), p. 2.
in the Armed Forces, have adjusted themselves to an
unfamiliar and uncomfortable world of war and peace. In the
process, the Federal Republic of Germany is discarding the
grand strategy of the so-called policy of reticence.
However, the new policy that will finally replace it remains
unclear as Europe and Germany struggle with the primacy of
domestic politics, the stalling of efforts at international
union, and the return of war to Europe.
Since the end of the Cold War in 19 89, western European
security policy has undergone a radical transformation.
National security planning and strategic military
preparation for ambiguous threats, coupled with shrinking
defense budgets, are of utmost concern to today's
politicians. 2 The fall of Communism and the Cold War
victory signifies this change in Europe's view of security
policy. The Cold War did not directly engage the opposing
Eastern Bloc and Western countries in open hostilities.
However, international conflicts, like the Persian Gulf War
or the crises in eastern Europe and Africa, will continue to
arise in the post-Cold War era.
Western European countries are grappling with a new
international security environment that is less clear than
during the former bipolar balance of power era. The linear
2
"NATO and the Changing Geopolitical Environment, " Global
Affairs , vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 1991, p. 175.
defense of one's homeland, while still a concern, has
lessened in importance in comparison to preventing or
managing conflicts on the periphery before these crises have
a chance to develop into first-order magnitude problems.
The western European democracies are faced with changing
their national security policies to reflect and keep pace
with the transformation in the Post-Cold War world.
The change in national security policy requires the
potential use of military rapid reaction or peacekeeping
forces to prevent further instability or to make an
adversary realize that the use of force is counter-
productive to peace. The central issue of participation in
military operations outside one's borders affects the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in a vastly different
context based primarily on Germany's past, than the older,
yet equally stable, democracies. The Persian Gulf War
became the watershed event in the debate over united
Germany's use of military force outside of accepted
constitutional, let alone historical and geographical,
parameters. The out-of-area issue raised during the Persian
Gulf War reflects a more complex question of German national
identity in the Post-Cold War world. 3
3Clay Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation? Redefining
Germany's Military Role Outside of NATO," in Armed Forces and
Society , vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 247.
Just as the American Constitution is a revered document
to American citizens, Germany's Federal Constitution (The
Basic Law) is seen in the same light by Germans. 4 The Basic
Law also represents the fundamental beginnings of modern
democratic rule in the Federal Republic of Germany. Like
many democracies, Germany's Basic Law covers the use of
military force which indirectly affects where German Federal
Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) can be deployed. There are
several Basic Law Articles which specifically deal with the
perceived limits on military deployment and involvement.
First, Article 24 of the Basic Law allows the FRG to
"enter a system of mutual collective security .. .as will
bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order ... among
the nations of the world." 5 Germany's entry into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , the Western European
Union (WEU) and the United Nations (UN) is covered by this
Article. In addition, Article 25 gives international law
precedence over national law. 6 Next, Article 26 bans
Germany from undertaking missions "with the intent to
disturb the peaceful relations between nations ... [and]
4Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany , (Press and
Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991), p. 5.
5Ibid., p. 18.
6Ibid.
especially to prepare for war of aggression." 7 Finally,
Article 87 (a) was inserted into the Basic Law in 1956 to
"establish [the] Armed Forces for defence purposes .. .Apart
from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used insofar as
explicitly permitted by [the] Basic Law." 8
The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union
diminished long standing conventional threats to Western
European security and stability. The warning time for a
potential attack by the former East Bloc countries now spans
years instead of just minutes during the high water mark of
the Cold War. Threats to a nation's well being have blurred
with the downfall of Communism. External threats are now
perceived to emanate from the rise in nationalism, religious
fundamentalism and ethnic strife in the less developed,
former second and the third world countries
.
Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the German political
parties' differing opinions regarding possible participation
in extra-territorial military operations renewed the debate
over amending the Basic Law provisions that cover the
perceived limited strategic use of the military. This
political debate evolved out of the unification process,
which highlighted the obsolescence of the now "normalized
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
and completely sovereign" FRG ' s forty year old "front line
defense" posture. The German debate over military missions
in the Post-Cold War era initially has focused on "Blue
Helmet" peacekeeping operations within regional and global
collective security organizations. 9 The debate further
developed toward the potential for combat missions. This
field of study is important because Germany's politicians
are at a crossroads. Germany's leadership is responsible
for adopting a national security policy attuned to the
ongoing transformation in the international scene and also
for maintaining a Post-Cold War military capable of
responding to unforeseen external threats
.
In properly understanding how the debate of utilizing
the Bundeswehr in a peacekeeping role has evolved, this
thesis will first highlight the historical perspective
concerning the development of Germany's national identity
and its impact upon the formulation of national security
policy. Next, a discussion of the German leadership's
decision not to take part in direct combat during the
Persian Gulf War will highlight this internal struggle and
foreshadow the dispute over a peacekeeping role for the
Bundeswehr. After the Persian Gulf War ended, the senior
9These organizations would include NATO (albeit a collective
defense organization) , CSCE, WEU and the UN.
Bundeswehr leadership openly argued for broadening future
military roles in regard to German national security policy.
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's parliamentary government
coalition of the Christian Democrat Union/Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democrat Party (FDP) have
differing viewpoints from the "loyal opposition" Social
Democrat Party (SPD) position as to what extent and how the
Bundeswehr should be used as a an instrument of policy. The
political debate centers around the perceived constitutional
role that the Bundeswehr should play in international
peacekeeping missions and a potential combat role. This
debate not only concerns Germany's political leadership, but
also greatly impacts upon the leaders of the other NATO
countries. The implications of increased German military
power causes inherent friction between Germany and the
European nations.
Ambivalence toward an enlarged German security role is
based on the disastrous historical record of Germany's past
military indiscretions. After a protracted struggle over
Hitler's Nazi Germany from September 193 9 to May 1945, the
victorious Allied Powers were determined not to make the
same mistake of not checking German rearmament which
occurred during the 1920 ' s and 1930 ' s
.
10 To prevent a
recurrence of German aggression, the Allies, immediately
after World War II, embarked upon a vigorous program to
sever all dysfunctional aspects of Germany's past by
"setting the clock at zero ( Stunde Null ) .
"
u The intent of
the Allied Powers was to alter German society and its
militaristic ways of thinking by rebuilding from the bottom
up through re-education and stripping away entrenched
belligerent attitudes.
The Allied Occupation Powers established regulations to
prohibit all military facets of life even so far as to
include military ceremonies, writings, uniforms and toy
soldiers. The Allied Powers perceived the question of
future German rearmament only within the framework of an
integrated, subsuming structure that could continue to
oversee control on any type of German unilateral military
action. 12 (The collective defense organization of NATO
eventually fulfilled this role) . The mind set that Germany
was never again to try its hand at hegemonic rule was re-
10Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Defense Organization in
Germany: A Twice Told Tale, " in Reorganizing America's Defense
Leadership in War and Peace , ed. by Robert J. Art, (New York:
Pergamon-Brassey




educated into society and its political leaders.
Eventually, the Federal Armed Forces were raised and armed.
However, the idea of using the military as a tool of foreign
policy was absent except as a force for the direct defense
of the Fatherland in maintaining Germany's sovereignty.
This idea became firmly entrenched over time and was
Germany's strategic policy in regard to the national
interest of self-preservation.
The FRG adopted a security policy oriented toward
multi-lateralism and collective defense to compensate for
the German leadership's impression of restricted sovereignty
in security issues. In addition, by maintaining a
multilaterally-oriented security policy the Bonn government
avoided the commitment toward a specific policy objective
that might be misconstrued by the Allied Powers as anything
but the widely accepted German national interest of direct
defense of the Fatherland. 13 The absence of old fashioned
German national security interests resulted from the long
held beliefs introduced by the Allied Powers after Germany's
defeat in World War II.
As a rule, German national interests did not have a
traditional lobby, voice or a channel, similar to those
13Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy, " Adelphi
Paper 277, (London: The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, June 1993), p. 4.
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found in countries like the United States or Great Britain,
through which a dialogue or public debate could be pursued
to arrive at a widely regarded common set of national
interests. Even the German media, in the early period of
the FRG ' s creation, did not consider its main task to be
that of serious analysis of national interests or
alternatives. 14 The German government also initially failed
to educate the public concerning anything but the basics of
using military force as a foreign policy tool to ensure
national interests were safeguarded. 15
Thus today, German politicians are perceived, by both
domestic and foreign critics, to be pursuing a policy of
realpolitik16 when they speak of national interests. That
is why many of today's German politicians feel ill at ease
in stating German foreign and security intentions. However,
stating national interests is a part of formulating foreign
policy. Domestic political agreement on a common foreign
and security policy can only be attained if Germans feel
14Foreian Broadcast Information Service Report- West Europe ,
(Hereafter referred as FBIS-WEU ) , 93-066, 8 April 1993, p. 18,
"National Security Interests Viewed, " in AU0504110393
Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Apr 93, p. 1.
15Schloer, p. 13
16According to the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary ,
G. & C. Merriam Co., (1977) edition, realpolitik is "politics
based on practical and material factors rather than on
theoretical or ethical objectives."
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they are adequately and legitimately being taken care of and
represented fairly. 17
Yet, during the Cold War, the FRG ' s national security
interests involved participation in only collective defense
and security organizations. By design, the Bundeswehr was
fully integrated into the NATO "layer cake" framework of
defense against a Soviet led attack. A traditional National
Command Authority (relative to the U.S. NCA) or an old style
German General Staff never developed within the FRG. The
German political culture of the Cold War era never seriously
considered allowing the Bundeswehr, let alone strictly
combat units, to venture beyond the NATO members' borders. 18
The German people possessed a deep seated aversion to
overtly militaristic policies as a result of the defeat in
World War II, the re-education of political culture and the
absence of armed conflict involving Germany for over forty
years. 19 There is no indication from the German government
that the FRG will abandon NATO nor the UN in favor of
unilateral military action. Therefore, the United States
has a vested interest in the resolution of the debate over
17FBIS-WEU , 93-060, 31 March 1993, p. 20, "Commentary Views
'National Interests' Reservation," in AU2603203493 Fankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German




peacekeeping missions and the trend toward an expanded
combat role for the Bundeswehr for the obvious reasons of
extended deterrence and increased security burdensharing by
Germany in the collective security and defense of NATO and
the European region.
A deeper level of cooperation in German-American
relations could result if the debate resolves favorably
toward a greater international security role for Germany.
The United States would benefit from German international
peacekeeping missions through an increase in the burden
sharing of regional and global security responsibilities.
Germany is a stable democratic state that is deeply
committed to the same ideals that the U.S. promotes through
maintaining free trade and preserving human rights
throughout the international community. Initial German
participation in missions similar to the Somalia operation
would greatly assist U.S. efforts to stabilize global flash
points before such crises might escalate into regional
conflicts. When regional conflicts arise that affect the
American government's interests or the national interests of
America's allies, it would benefit the U.S. position if the
German peacekeeping debate to allow for the use of military
force for other than defense purposes should lead to an
eventually expanded combat role for the Bundeswehr.
13
A positive resolution of the German debate would ensure that
one of America's strongest security partners would be
politically and militarily capable, when and if the need
should arise in the uncertain future, of reacting to acts of
violent, armed aggression.
14
II. GERMAN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
German foreign and security policy makes no sense in the
present without a clear analysis of the past two centuries
of German history. Current German foreign and security
policy cannot objectively be viewed by itself without an
understanding of the historical process of German national
unification and the nation's inclusion into the system of
states. To peer into Germany's future, one has to look back
at its past. The uniqueness of German statecraft is deeply
rooted in its historical legacy of being centered in the
middle of Europe, surrounded by stronger sovereign states
and fearful of invasion and subjugation.
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the
relationship between the European states was stable
primarily due to the success of Austrian Prince Metternich's
statecraft and diplomacy in the form of the Concert of
Europe and the Holy Alliance. 20 The modern German state did
not yet exist. Prussia was the largest and most influential
of the 39 Germanic principalities. The Old Regime, crafted
20Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815: Alternate Edition ,
(Fort Worth, Texas: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974),
p. 17.
15
by Metternich and his generation, maintained peace and
consensus from 1815 until 1848 when the ideas of liberalism
and nationalism took hold in the form of revolution. Yet, by
the 1850 's, conservatism and the monarchies were still in
control. However, Metternich and his generation, which
espoused the ideals of open diplomacy in which international
relations were conducted in an above board manner, began to
fade from the limelight. 21
The age of realism and Social Darwinism dawned. Mass
politics and industrialization began to take shape also.
The drive for national self-determination and unity was
achieved during the coming decades of increased competition
and mutual distrust between the European nations and the
development of realpolitik (practical politics). The new
politicians were to take matters into their own hands and
shape events through shrewd diplomacy and the increasing use
of limited war to reach their goals of consolidating power
within the nation-state. Thus, political maneuvering and
waging war took on a new light. Politics and war became the
tools of the Realpolitiker . The Prussian envoy to the
Germanic Confederation, Prince Otto von Bismarck, had a
hidden agenda of seeking unity for the German states that
21Ibid. p. 97.
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excluded Austria. Bismarck was determined to strengthen the
Prussian Army and adopt an expansionist and aggressive
foreign policy with the ultimate goal of consolidating
German power into a unified state. 22
Bismarck epitomized the quintessential Realpolitiker by
playing one power against another to his advantage. Through
shrewd diplomacy and limited war, Bismarck was able to keep
his enemies off balance and consolidate power for a Greater
Germany. However, Prussia would not absorb Germany as many
Prussian statesmen hoped for, but just the opposite; Prussia
was subsumed within a Greater Germany. Bismarck's political
maneuvering was interspersed with war against the Danes in
1864 (aided by the Austrians) , war against Austria in 1866
and war against France in 187 l. 23 Germany did not become a
sovereign nation until Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck's
"blood and iron" realpolitik methods proved successful in
the wars for German independence against Austria and then
France from 1866 to 1871. 24 In uniting the disjointed German
states under one ruler; Kaiser Wilhelm I, Bismarck as
Minister-President was able to manipulate the "Old Soldier"
22 Ibid., p. 118-119.
23 Ibid., p. 151-153, 170.
24 Ibid., p. 110, 149-155, 169-171.
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and wield considerable influence in German foreign policy-
making. 25
Many times, Bismarck would conduct his ruthless, closed-
door, heavy-handed diplomatic tactics (all in the name of
German nationalism) with the leaders of the other great
powers of Europe and then later inform the Emperor that his
actions were in the best interests of the country.
Bismarck's Germany was increasingly seen as a rising power
that dealt with international relations in the same
aggressive manner as Bismarck handled his duties as Prime
Minister. Bismarck was quoted: "the great questions of the
day will not be settled by resolutions and majority
votes... but by blood and iron." 26 Yet, near the end of the
nineteenth century, Bismarck found it increasingly difficult
to maintain the balance of power he had fashioned through
his secret treaties and alliances.
Upon the death of Kaiser Wilhelm I, in 1888, his
grandson, Wilhelm II took the throne and coupled with the
resignation of Bismarck in 1890 another generational change
in leadership took place. The youthful and impetuous
Wilhelm II had no desire to be led around by Bismarck (as
his grandfather had been). Wilhelm II rejected Bismarck's
25Ibid.
26Robert G.L. Waite, ed. , Hitler and Nazi Germany ,
(New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 31
18
foreign policies and regarded his alliance network as too
complex. 27 The generational change in statesmen eclipsed
Bismarck's goal of ensuring Germany remained within the top
three out of the five Great European Powers. The stage was
set for a change in the balance of power within Europe.
Kaiser Wilhelm II 's Chancellors abilities to influence
the international scene did not compare to Bismarck's
mastery of statecraft, which he attained over several
decades of service. The German Chancellors Caprivi and
Hohenlohe, from 1890 to 1900, tried and failed. 28 Wilhelm II
was fond of boasting about Germany's power to lesser states
and he began to practice a policy of Weltpolitik (world
politics) or imperialism. The German claims for greater
territorial expansion placed Germany in direct competition
with the already established colonial empires of Great
Britain and France. "Lebensraum" (living space) became the
new German watchword professed by the Wilhelmine Foreign
Ministers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries , 29
27George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European
Order , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 421
2 8Craig, p. 258
29David Kaiser, Politics and War , (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981), p. 9.
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German Chancellor von Bulow revelled in his leading role
of promoting imperialism and the growth of German
navalism. 30 Admiral von Tirpitz was primarily responsible
for the naval arms build up within Germany and the
establishment of a "risk fleet" to defeat the great maritime
power of Great Britain in a future war. 31 Under Chancellor
Bethmann Hollweg's tenure, German foreign policy followed a
course with the common theme that war was inevitable. Many
in Germany feared that their country would be crushed in the
middle of Europe between a resurgent Russia and a vindictive
France as a result of France's resounding loss during the
Franco-Prussian War of 1871. This attitude fueled an
aggressive arms build up which further isolated Germany.
Germany was thus drawn into the volkisch conflicts in
the Balkans in 1914 by attempting to maintain the support
and alliance framework established between Germany and the
weakened Austrian Hapsburg Empire. The outcome of such a
political "leap into the dark" led to World War I. 32 The end
result of the most violent European war up to that time was
that a defeated Germany received the blame, from the
victorious Allied Powers, for the cause of horrific war.
30Craig, p. 259.
31Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars ,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9.
32 Ibid., p. 37.
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In the aftermath of the First World War, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was carved up, the Russian Empire was
toppled by a civil war and Communist revolution and the
German monarchy and Second Reich gave way, through the
German revolution, to the German Weimar Republic (an
abortive attempt in the long run at liberal democracy)
.
Yet, political issues of nationalism and imperialism were
not resolved in World War I. The seeds of discontent and
retribution were further sown in the punitive peace treaties
concluded after hostilities ended.
Many historians regarded Bismarck's unique creation of a
Prusso-Germanic nation-state as the beginnings of "a problem
child of Europe" in which Bismarck, then Kaiser Wilhelm II
and finally Adolf Hitler, each assisted by a headstrong
military class, were successful in "inculcating a lust for
power and domination, a passion for unbridled
militarism. .. and a longing for authoritarianism." 33
Adolf Hitler's rise to power throughout the 1920 's and
his consolidation of power in the 1930 's can be seen as a
tragic outcome of the German dissatisfaction toward the
punitive demands placed on a vanquished country. Hitler's
Third Reich epitomized the high point in German totalitarian
rule. Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany by
33Waite, p. 31.
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President Paul von Hindenberg on 3 January 1933 and upon
Hindenberg's death a year later Hitler proclaimed himself as
both Fuehrer and Chancellor. Hitler's assumption of
dictatorial rule assured the National Socialist German
Workers Party (Nazi party) of a leader (fuehrer) who would
ensure Germany's rise to great power status would not be
jeopardized again. 34
Hitler's rise to power was based on regaining Germany's
proper place in Europe and uniting all of the European
Germans under his control. Hitler saw the Russian Bolshevik
movement, backed by the Jews, as the reason for Germany's
fall from its rightful place as the hegemonic power of
Europe. 35 Under the banner of National Socialism, Hitler
consolidated his domestic power base for his imperialist
push to seize control of the repressed German minorities
throughout eastern Europe. Hitler, before abolishing the
Reichstag (German Weimar Republic parliament) , was given
dictatorial powers by its members and he embarked upon a
series of machtpolitik (power politics) actions to re-
establish universal military service and raise the army back
to a level of prestige from which it had fallen after its
defeat in World War I.
34 Ibid., p. 11.
35Hillgruber, p. 51
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German officers did not swear an oath of absolute
allegiance to the constitution, but to Adolf Hitler
himself. 36 Hitler, an ex-Corporal who survived heavy-
fighting throughout World War I and was decorated with the
Iron Cross, both First and Second Class (a rarity for a
Non-commissioned Officer) , understood the need to have the
strong support of the Armed Forces. 37 He needed the military
behind him to ensure the enforcement of his decisions to
promote violent racial nationalism, to oppose liberal
democracy and to guarantee that the Germanic peoples
throughout Europe were regarded as the master race over the
"less-human" Slavic and Jewish peoples of eastern Europe. 3 '
His ambitions brought about the beginning of World War II
and culminated in the downfall of the Third Reich. Hitler's
goal of Germany as a world power gave way to the destruction
of Germany and German national unity itself. 39 Josef
Stalin, leader of the victorious Soviet Union, ensured that
Germany would not rise again by securing a Soviet desired
buffer zone in eastern Europe and also through the partition
36Waite, p. 12.




of Germany itself. 40 New alignments of power within Europe
resulted from the aftermath of World War II.
Stalin attempted to control Germany through unification
under Communist rule by utilizing the surrogate German
Communist party (Social Unity Party- SED) . However, under
Konrad Adenauer's leadership, which was a combination of
realism and idealism, the western zones adopted a
constitutional framework, known as the Basic Law, and
transformed West Germany from a defeated enemy into a
respected ally of the Western camp. 41 Adenauer, a member of
the Christian Democrat Union party and the first Chancellor
of the nascent Federal Republic of Germany, paved the way
for the FRG to become a cornerstone of Western democracy in
the ideological Cold War against Communist aggression.
Eventhough Germany was politically and physically divided
into the two states of the Communist-run German Democratic
Republic (GDR) and the democratic Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) , Adenauer did not officially recognize the GDR
as a separate state. He maintained that Germany would
eventually be reunited into one nation under a democratic




division of Germany would remain an issue of contention
during the Cold War.
The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the
United States, and the Benelux countries convened the London
Conference from February to June 1948. One recommendation
of the meeting was the introduction of the federal
government system for Germany and authorization for the
Minister Presidents of the western Laender (German states)
to establish a constitutional assembly. This German
Parliamentary Council, chaired by Konrad Adenauer, met on
1 September 1948. The Council, composed of 65 voting
members from the political parties and five members from
Berlin who only had advisory status, formulated and passed
the Basic Law of the FRG by a vote of 53 to 12. 42 The
Western Occupation Powers also accepted the Basic Law.
On 23 May 1949 the constitution became effective and the
Federal Republic of Germany was born. 43
The origins of the Federal Republic of Germany's
national security policy, as highlighted by the German
42A Mandate For Democracy , (Press and Information Office of
the Federal Government, May 1980), p. 85, 88-89. The CDU/CSU had
27 members; SPD had 27; FDP had 5; the German Party (DP) 2; the
Communist Party (KPD) 2; and the Center Party (Zentrum) 2 present
at the Constitutional Assembly.
43John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89; A Political
History , (London: Edward Arnold Inc., 1991), p. 58.
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debate surrounding the Allied Powers' decision to allow
German rearmament through Germany's inclusion into NATO on
5 May 1955, centered around the growing Soviet-dominated
threat from the East. It should be noted that the FRG did
not become a member of NATO (nor remilitarize) until after
primarily U.S. urging forced the other NATO members to
realize the strategic and geographic position that Germany
occupied in countering the Soviet threat. 44 The Korean War
played a substantial role in helping the U.S. to pressure
the Allied countries of western Europe into allowing Germany
to establish its Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) , rearm
and join NATO.
The prevailing argument used by the U.S. was that the
Korean War, as seen in the context of a Soviet engineered
Cold War regional conflict, would escalate into another
World War centered primarily in Europe. The perception of
the "Domino Principle" of Communist expansion into western
Europe necessitated the call among the Allied Powers to
adopt a multilateral security policy of forward defense and
burdensharing that included German military participation.
Thus, a concerted Soviet military push into western Europe
at that critical period would prove disastrous to western
44The United Kingdom and to a lesser degree France also saw
the need for Germany to be included into the NATO collective
defense framework.
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European stability and security. The debate between the
European countries and within Germany itself eventually led
to the realization that if a western European security
policy was to be successful in containing Communist
expansion, then the FRG must be remilitarized and become a
member of NATO.
As the debate continued, the Soviet threat became more
significant. Konrad Adenauer, in an attempt to garner as
much control as possible for the FRG under the unique
circumstances of Germany's limited sovereignty, played into
the hands of the Allied Powers who sought Germany's
inclusion within a multilateral security framework geared
toward a forward strategy of extended deterrence. Within
Germany, he was opposed in his efforts to ensure the FRG was
included in the North Atlantic Alliance mainly by the Social
Democrat Party. 45 However, since the next war was fearfully
perceived to begin on the inner German border, the FRG was
permitted to share in the burden of maintaining the
collective defense of western Europe. Germany was initially
authorized to build up an armed force of 500,000 men. On
45Craig, p. 521.
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14 May 1955, the Soviet Union countered by organizing the
East Bloc states into the Warsaw Pact. 4 ^ The sides were set
for the long siege of the Cold War.
Numerous times throughout the Cold War, the German
government debated the parameters to which German military
forces should be utilized. This long standing debate began
in earnest from 1949 through 1955 with the creation of the
Federal Republic of Germany and its inclusion in NATO.
West Germany's national security policy and military
organizational structure became fully intertwined within the
NATO collective defense framework and strategy of defending
against a Soviet invasion. The Communist onslaught
primarily would be across the FRG ' s eastern border and thus
make West Germany the front line of defense. Upon the
establishment of the Eundeswehr, Article 87(a) amended the
constitution, by federal statute on 19 March 1956, 47 to
permit the FRG to build up and use its military for "defense
purposes." 4 * In addition, Article 87(a) further specified
4f
'Ibid., p. 551.
47Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany , p. 48.
4HPaul B. Stares, Allied Rights and Legal Constraints on
German Military Power
,




that "apart from defense, the Armed Forces may only be used
insofar as explicitly permitted by the Basic Law.
"
49
However, the role of the Bonn government in formulating
foreign and defense policy was highlighted by the internal
political struggle for power. This internal struggle for
influence in making security policy has involved the trinity
of the Chancellor and his Ministers of Defense and Foreign
Affairs, the political parties within the more powerful
Bundestag as opposed to the Bundesrat, and the military.
The Federal Republic of Germany, unlike the United States,
is a parliamentary democracy. The executive and legislative
functions are more intertwined and closely linked in the FRG
system of government than in the U.S. federal system of
government. In Germany, only the members of the Bundestag
are directly elected by the people. The Chancellor is
elected by the members of the Bundestag and he acts as the
head of government.
The German Federal President is elected by a majority
vote of the Federal Convention which is an assembly composed
of all the Bundestag members. The Federal President is
elected every five years and can only be re-elected once.
The President represents the state from a position above the
daily political fray as a non-partisan player and acts as
49Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany , p. 48
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the head of state in a largely ceremonial capacity. The
powers of the Presidency are based on the moral authority of
the office rather than on any real political power. In
contrast, the President of the United States acts as both
head of state and government. 50
The political leader of the FRG is the Chancellor. The
Chancellor, acting as Prime Minister, heads the executive
branch of the Federal Government and is elected by the
Bundestag for a four year term. 51 The Chancellor formulates
and executes the domestic and foreign affairs of the
government and is responsible to the Bundestag in performing
these duties. The Chancellor names his Cabinet Ministers
who are directly responsible to him in carrying out their
duties. The Ministers cannot be removed by the Bundestag.
The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the Federal
President, but only upon the proposal of the Chancellor. 52
The Defense Minister has traditionally been from the same
party as the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister has been
from the swing or junior party making up the coalition
majority in the Bundestag. When the FRG was first
50Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties ,
(New York: German Information Center, 1990), p. 2-3, 13-14.
51U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Background Notes: Germany , June 1991, p. 5.
52Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties ,
p. 12.
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established, Konrad Adenauer was both Chancellor and Foreign
Minister until 1955 and the Defense Minister's post was not
established until 1955."
The political parties play a significantly greater role
in the German Federal system of government than the American
political parties do in the U.S. government. The political
parties determine the executive head of governemnt based on
which party or coalition of parties possess a majority of
seats (and thus votes) in the Bundestag. The Bundestag or
Lower House is the largest freely elected parliament in the
world. 54 The Bundestag is composed of 662 deputies whom
also are elected for a four year term and closely
approximates to the U.S. House of Representatives. The
Bundestag represents 328 electoral districts throughout
Germany and is the "chief repository of political power
delegated by the sovereign people through their votes." 05
The main function of the Bundestag is to formulate, debate
and pass legislation. The Bundestag significantly wields





"Bundestag Is Largest Freely-Elected Parliament in the
World, " The Week in Germany , (New York: German Information
Center, 15 October 1993), p. 6.
5
'Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties ,
p. 5-6.
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The Bundesrat is the Upper Chamber or Federal Council
composed of 68 members. 56 The number of votes cast in the
Bundesrat by the state delegates is based on the respective
population of the 16 Laender (German states) . The Bundesrat
delegates represent their state governments and primarily
are responsible for matters concerning Laender interests.
The Bundesrat can also object to legislation passed by the
other House, but the Bundestag can override this veto by a
simple majority vote. In addition, the Bundesrat shares in
the nation's legislative process through its required
consent on constitutional amendments. If the Bundesrat is
controlled by a party or coalition that is different from
the party or coalition in control of the Bundestag, the
Bundesrat can also cause a degree of friction or gridlock in
the passage of programs in the Federal government. 57
Thus, the political parties within the Bundestag, the
Chancellor and his Ministers and to a lesser extent the
military play an important role in identifying, formulating
and approving foreign and security policy under the
burdensharing collective defense umbrella of extended
deterrence. Throughout the Cold War, the stationing of
56U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Background Notes: Germany , p. 5.
57Germanv: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties ,
p. 15.
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nuclear weapons on German soil highlighted the limited
sovereignty Germany maintained in defense related issues and
also was cause for great debate within the domestic West
German political environment. This security debate centered
around the introduction into Germany of nuclear arms in the
late 1950 's without the guarantee that German input and
influence on their use within the confines of the greater
German nation would receive due consideration and continued
through the shift in NATO's nuclear strategy from massive
retaliation to flexible response in the 1960 's. The German
domestic attitude prevailed that both Germanies would be the
next nuclear battleground in the event of an escalation of
the Cold War. Therefore, war was seen as a worst case
scenario for German society as a whole. This view was
supported by the ensuing political argument over the idea of
employing the Neutron bomb in the mid 1970' s and finally
culminated in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty implementation in the early 1980 ' s.
The German trinity of the state, seen through the
actions of the Bonn government, the people, represented by
the political parties in the Bundestag, and the military has
clashed over the extent to which German security policy
should have an impact beyond the geographic borders of the
FRG and the NATO guaranteed area of defense. The policy of
not allowing military forces to operate outside the
33
traditional parameters of NATO was effectively legitimized
on 1 September 1982 when the Federal Security Council, under
Chancellor Schmidt's term in office, committed the SPD-FDP
colalition government to a restrictive interpretation of the
Basic Law in not permitting out of area military missions.
Furthermore, on 3 November 1982, after the formation of the
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government headed by Chancellor Kohl,
the Federal Security Council reaffirmed the view "that
military operations outside the NATO area [were] out of the
question." 58 Thus the security policy of military non-
intervention oputside of traditional boundaries was clearly
spelled out by both major parties when each controlled the
government
.
The use of the Armed Forces for extra-territorial
peacekeeping or peace enforcing means was not in the
forefront of German politics during the Cold War. The
general consensus within the FRG during the Cold War was to
utilize the Armed Forces for national defense of West German
territory within the collective defense alliance framework.
A synergism of both domestic and foreign policy occurred
within Germany. Attitudes within Germany shaped security
policy which over the forty year Cold War period were
58FBIS-WEU , 93-075, 21 April 1993, p. 17, "Constitutional
Court Unhappy as Policy Arbitrator, " in 93EN03 81A Hamburg DER
SPIEGEL in German No. 15, 12 Apr 93, p. 22-25.
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brought about by the "complex and contradictory emotions" of
defeat in World War II, deliverance from the totalitarian
Nazi regime and the physical division of the once powerful
German nation into the democratic West Germany and the
Communist-run East Germany. 59
Accordingly, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and German reunification fast becoming a reality in the
post-Cold War 1990 's, the long-held belief that Germany's
national security policy should only be tied to front line
defense began to give way to a more outward looking
position. 60 A transformation in strategic thinking began as
the possibility of German unification became apparent.
The disintegration of Communist rule in East Germany, as
signified by the opening of the Berlin Wall on
9 November 1989, highlighted the efforts to begin the
unification process. 61 The first democratic parliamentary
elections in the GDR occurred on 18 March 1990 in which the
majority of East Germans voted to abandon their form of
59Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe , (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 331.
60Burkhard Koch, Germany's New Assertiveness In
International Relations; Between Reality and Misperceotion ,
(Stanford University: The Hoover Institution, 1992), p. 6.
61A. James McAdams, Germany Divided , (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), p. 3.
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government outright and to support the quickest means to
unification with the FRG. 62
From the spring through the fall of 1990, the FRG
grasped the opportunity to attain the long held desire to
become a unified nation again. Chancellor Helmut Kohl,
primarily with the help of the United States and to a lesser
degree the other Allied nations, took advantage of the
opportunity to unify the two Germanies within the NATO
alliance. On 17 July 1990, the Soviet Union informally
agreed to the terms of the unification plan of absorbing
East Germany into a West Germany still structured within the
NATO alliance. The Two Plus Four Treaty, signed in Moscow
by the FRG, the GDR and the four Allied Powers (the U.S.,
France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) on 12 September 1990
gave Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external
affairs. 63 Furthermore, the Soviet troops stationed in East
Germany were to leave by the end of 1994 and the Four Powers
were to terminate their security related responsibilities
within Germany and Berlin. The FRG also was granted the
right to belong to any alliances incumbent with all the
rights and responsibilities arising from membership into
62Ibid., p. 4.
63Hilmar Linnenkamp, "The Security Policy of the New
Germany," in The New Germany and the New Europe , Paul B. Stares,
ed.
,
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 97.
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such organizations. 64 The signing of the Two Plus Four
Treaty legitimized the formal political union which
officially took place on 3 October 1990. 65
During the German unification process, a change in post-
Cold War NATO strategy also occurred. This transformation
was outlined in the London Declaration of 1990 whereby NATO
began to extend its political and military ties outside of
traditional bounds. 66 According to NATO's London Declaration
issued on 6 July 1990, "the hand of friendship" was extended
to the East Bloc countries and the Warsaw Pact was no longer
viewed as adversaries to the North Atlantic Alliance. 67
The London Declaration also specified that "a united Germany
in the Atlantic Alliance .. .will be an indispensable factor
of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe." 68
As outlined in the NATO Declaration, the need to maintain a
European defense policy and thus a German security policy
directly tied to front-line defense became obsolete. 69
64 Ibid.
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These changes in the international and domestic
political scene required a re-thinking of German
foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, the Allied
military build up in the Persian Gulf region (Operation
Desert Shield) , as a prelude to the Persian Gulf War
(Operation Desert Storm) , and the implications of not only
NATO's assistance to Turkey through deployment of NATO
military forces, but German military participation in the
multilateral effort came at the most inopportune time.
However, Germany did contribute enormous amounts of materiel
and money to support the Allied effort and German military
combat units did deploy as part of the NATO contingent to
Turkey prior to the commencement of hostilities on
16 January 1991. 70
Germany's political leaders were not yet ready to deal
with NATO out-of-area security policy issues brought about
by the Persian Gulf War. The FRG was still dealing with the
central issue of unification and negotiating with the Soviet
Union on the final terms of the Treaty. The Persian Gulf
War became the watershed event in the early Post-Cold War
period for the FRG on determining the route that Germany
should take in formulating a new security outlook. The
70Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany and the Iraq
Conflict, " in Western Europe and the Gulf , Nicole Gnesotto and
John Roper, ed.
,
(Paris: The Institute for Security Studies,
Western European Union, 1992), p. 55.
political security debate on the extent of using military-
forces for peacekeeping, let alone combat missions was
ignited again.
On a regional level, in June 1992, NATO adopted a new
strategy of using its troops and equipment for peacekeeping
operations in European conflicts beyond the "NATO guaranteed
area." This NATO position was qualified on the grounds that
requests for peacekeeping missions would only be entertained
from the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe) and on a case-by-case basis. 71 Furthermore, the
NATO ministers acknowledged that any NATO peacekeeping
measures did not have to be fulfilled by all 16 member
states. 72 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger, at that time, aptly stated that this NATO
decision was a "major step forward [in] putting meat on the
bones of the idea of peacekeeping." 73 Since Germany's
defense posture and military forces were so intertwined
within the NATO strategy and organizational structure, the
debate on peacekeeping missions had taken on an even greater
71Craig R. Whitney. "NATO Sees a Role With Peacekeepers for
Eastern Europe," New York Times , 5 June 1992, p. Al
.
72William Drozdiak. "NATO Widens Mandate on Forces."
Washington Post , 5 June 1992, p. A41.
73
"Peacekeeping Role Expands NATO's Task." Aviation Week and
Space Technology , vol. 136, no. 23, 8 June 1992, p. 71.
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magnitude in the post-Cold War period. The debate among the
political parties again became heated regarding the previous
limitations placed on the Bundeswehr's role in relation to
an altered German security policy.
In the Post-Cold War era, the Bundeswehr faced two
problems; the first being that the immediate threat of
invasion from the east was gone and the second pertaining to
the increased threat of crises emanating on "distant
horizons" which would affect European and thus German
stability and security. 74 German politicians increasingly
began to call upon the government to define the policy of
adopting an international peacekeeping role for the
Bundeswehr. 75 This issue was in consonance with previous
requests made in 1989 and 1990, from within the UN General
Assembly, to seek out innovative approaches for member
states to provide military units earmarked specifically for
UN peacekeeping missions. 76 Yet, the UN Security Council
recognized that peacekeeping commitments made by member
states should only be assumed with the consent of the host
74Christoph Bertram. "The Bundeswehr Is Still Trying to Find
Its Real Place in the Changed World, " Die Zeit , Hamburg,
4 Sept. 1992, translated in english in The German Tribune ,
11 Sept. 1992, no. 1531, p. 5.
75Ibid
76
"UN Peacekeeping Activities Need Broad Support,
"
UN Chronicle , vol. 27, no. 1, March 1990, p. 74.
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country and all parties concerned. 77 If such a mission were
to be undertaken by the FRG, a political consensus would
first have to be reached within the German Parliament to
authorize the deployment of military units for peacekeeping
purposes. However, the peacekeeping role debate between the
political parties intensified concerning the perceived
requirement for an amendment to the constitution (which
would have to be passed by a two thirds majority vote of
Parliament) to allow such a mission to take place.
Still, German military precedence for UN Blue Helmet
operations has been set by non-Bundeswehr , non-combat
oriented units. Small steps were undertaken by the
government to further define the parameters in which the
military could be used as a tool of diplomacy. Examples of
these steps include the September 1989 deployment of 50
Federal Border Guards who travelled to Namibia to oversee
elections in that African country. In August 1991, 15 Border
Guards monitored the cease-fire between Morocco and the
Polisario Liberation Movement in the Western Sahara.
In June 1992, 75 Border Guards and 150 military medical
77
"Security Council Urges Support for UN Peacekeeping
Operations," UN Chronicle , vol. 27, no. 3, September 1990, p. 11
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personnel travelled to Cambodia to support the UN's
peacekeeping efforts. 78
Although these efforts have been symbolic gestures, the
Kohl government has been accused by the loyal opposition
parties of slowly edging closer toward a full fledged
peacekeeping role without the necessary dialogue and formal
constitutional legitimation. The German military deployment
of combat troops to Turkey during the UN-mandated Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm marked a departure away from
previous deployments. The combat troop movement into
Turkey, although under the auspices of defense of a NATO
partner, blurred old distinctions and gave a new quality to
the idea of utilizing the military for possible extra-
regional foreign and security policy actions.
German military involvement in the Bosnia-Hercegovina
and the Somalia crises are further indicators that the
military might be used for missions other than an intended
humanitarian assistance role. The trend toward solving
crisis situations through the use of peacekeeping forces has
increased. In the past four years, the UN has established
11 peacekeeping operations throughout the globe. This is in
78FBIS-WEU , 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to
Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER
SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-29.
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contrast to 14 peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN in
the previous 40 years. During 1991, the UN deployed
51,000 peacekeeping troops, which was an increase of
40,000 from the previous year. 79
Also during 1991, the UN-mandated, U.S. -led coalition
deployed approximately 600,000 military personnel to the
Persian Gulf in anticipation of Operation Desert Storm.
The Iraqi crisis proved that distant regional conflicts
endangered national interests and even though a Cold War
security policy of frontline defense against a Soviet threat
had significantly diminished, a redefinition of extended
deterrence and burdensharing responsibilities in a changed
international security environment remained a valid concern.
The actions of military coalitions and existing alliances,
like NATO, continued to impact upon the Post-Cold War era.
79Paul Lewis. "Europeans Urge the UN to Act More
Aggressively to Prevent War, " New York Times ,
23 Sept. 1992, p. A16.
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III. PERSIAN GULF WAR - WATERSHED EVENT
In the midst of the historic opportunity for German
unification and the end of the East-West confrontation in
Europe during the summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein triggered
the first Post-Cold War confrontation by invading Kuwait on
2 August 1990. The Persian Gulf War became the watershed
event in the political debate on German military involvement
beyond the traditional "NATO guaranteed area." The FRG '
s
decision not to use its military for direct combat caused a
national debate within Germany over its proper burdensharing
security role in the world. 80 The Gulf War, the first major
regional conflict in the Post-Cold War era, indicated that
the use of military force, to counter hegemonic aggression,
would continue to be required in order to maintain stability
and peace. The Gulf War proved to be an indicator that
German military personnel could in the future be called upon
80Ray Moseley, "Germany Debates Global Role, " Chicago
Tribune , 24 July 1991, Sec. 2C, p. 11.
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to risk their lives if the proper conditions existed for
their deployment. 81
To understand fully the ramifications that the Persian
Gulf War had on the divisive issue of German military
participation in extra-territorial conflicts, one must first
realize the historic events facing Germany's leadership
during the Iraqi crisis. In the summer and fall of 1990,
the utmost concern of German policy makers was the hope that
the international condemnation and reaction to the Iraqi
invasion would not interfere with the complex and still
incomplete arrangements engineered by the FRG and its allies
in negotiating the German unification with the Soviet
Union's leadership. 82 The process of unification completely
absorbed the public's attention and the leadership's foreign
policy actions. 83
The Persian Gulf War came at the worst time for
Germany's leadership. German politicians were ill-equipped
to handle the issue of military involvement in a distant
regional conflict involving Germany's allies. Security and
81FBIS-WEU , 92-022, 3 February 1992, p. 19, "Stoltenberg on
New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy," in 92GE0202A Frankfurt/Main
SOLDAT UND TECNIK in German No. 1, Jan 92, pp. 9-12.
82Kaiser and Becher, p. 39
83Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification,
"
in The New Germany and the New Europe , Paul B. Stares, ed.
,
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 135
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foreign affairs policy workers were thoroughly engrossed in
trying to accomplish the task of unifying Germany while at
the same time ensuring that the USSR would militarily
disengage itself from East Germany through the adoption of
the Two Plus Four Treaty. In addition, the Bonn government
was attempting to enhance the development of the mechanisms
for Europe to deal with the Post-Cold War environment
through agreement of the tenets laid out in the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) . The
German Defense Ministry was also involved in the delicate




The Allied military build up and the Persian Gulf War
suited neither the political desires of Germany's
leadership, burdened with unification, nor the mood of the
German people. The general euphoria experienced by German
society in achieving full nationhood was severely
constrained by the harsh realities that a regional conflict
could erupt into a large scale war. The perception that any
overt NATO military action might force the Soviet Union to
withdraw from the unification process and jeopardize the
German goal of attaining full sovereignty weighed heavily on
84 Ibid.
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Chancellor Kohl's government. The initial hesitancy of the
Bonn government to issue any policy statements supporting
the U.S. -led effort to contain and reverse Iraqi aggression
explained German fears of NATO and German military
intervention in the crisis. The Bonn government did not
issue a hard line stance toward the Iraqi invasion for fear
that the security issue would be pushed to the forefront of
the decision-making process at a critical period in the Two
Plus Four negotiations and that Germany would be drawn into
the conflagration.
On 20 August 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, a leading member of the FDP, sought to find a way
out of the political dilemma of pledging support to the
Allied effort while also attempting not to alienate the
Soviet Union. He reiterated that the legal means for direct
military participation in an area not covered under the
framework of the NATO defense guarantee was not
constitutionally possible at that time without a
clarification of the Basic Law. 85 However, Olaf Feldmann,
security spokesman for the FDP, stated that his party was
not against UN-coordinated peacekeeping missions. He
qualified the statement by adding that this type of
85FBIS-WEU , 90-161, 20 August 1990, p. 17, "Kohl, Genscher,
Stoltenberg Confer, " in AU2008105690 Cologne Deutschlandfunk
Network in German 0900 GMT 20 Aug 90.
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Bundeswehr operation would first require clarification of
the Basic Law. 86 The German public and the government were
not mentally prepared to cast off the traditional Cold War
security policy mentality of only providing for the direct
defense of Germany and NATO. The thought of fighting a war
on distant horizons was incomprehensible to both western and
eastern Germans. 87
At the onset of Iraqi aggression, the German public was
divided on the course to be taken in foreign affairs that
directly concerned German interests in the Gulf region. The
main concerns were for the safety of the German nationals
who were held hostage in Iraq by Hussein's forces and the
fear that Germany would be pulled into an unwanted war.
Former Chancellor Willy Brandt of the SPD party and
Germany's principal elder statesman privately travelled to
Iraq with the intent to secure the freedom of the German
hostages. Chancellor Kohl did not support Brandt's actions,
yet he tolerated the breach of protocol. 88 Chancellor Kohl
knew that a political resolution of the hostage situation,
let alone the use of military force in reversing Hussein's
86Ibid., p. 16, "Politicians Still Split on Issue, in





invasion of Kuwait, was not possible within the restrictive
framework of Germany's Cold War security policy mentality.
Willy Brandt returned to Germany on 9 November 1990
accompanied by 175 freed hostages of which 131 were Germans,




A survey conducted in September 1990 for the newspaper
Die Zeit showed that only 47% of the German population
polled thought that the Bundeswehr should be used outside
NATO limits if German citizens were in danger and only 46%
agreed to an out-of-area military deployment if the United
Nations requested German assistance. 90 In early January
1991, another survey of German public opinion was conducted
by the Emnid Institute of Frankfurt, which was commissioned
by the Saudi Arabian Embassy, to determine if German
attitudes toward greater involvement in the crisis were
favorable. The results also showed hesitation on what type
of action should be pursued by the German government in the
Iraqi crisis. Only 14% of the Germans polled favored a
greater commitment while 43% were satisfied with the FRG '
s
89Ibid.
90Kaiser and Becher, p. 48.
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current action and 40% favored further restraint by Germany
in the Gulf conflict. 91
As the public opinion surveys showed, a political
consensus on taking decisive steps toward military
involvement in the Gulf region was not possible nor present
prior to the start of hostilities. After the UN mandate to
permit the use of military force in the Gulf crisis was
passed and war seemed inevitable, Defense Minister Gerhard
Stoltenberg (CDU) , at a special Bundestag session on
14 January 1991, stated that, "Germany is not taking part in
the military deployment in the Gulf... the decisive reason
for that is the special constitutional situation and
interpretation. " 92
The Allied perceptions of German inaction strengthened
the call within the German political parties and the
government for a rethinking in both the scope and the means
of foreign and security policy. An example of foreign
pressure aimed at Germany to take a more active role was
echoed in British Ambassador Sir Christopher Mallaby's
91FBIS-WEU , 91-008, 11 January 1991, p. 11, "Poll: Germans
Reject Military Action in Gulf," in LD1001222991 Hamburg DPA in
German 1414 GMT 10 Jan 91.
92 Ibid., 91-010, 15 January 1991, p. 14, "Defense Minister
Delivers Statement to Bundestag, " in AU1401202991 Mainz ZDF
Television Network in German 1502 GMT 14 Jan 91.
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railing, "We know your Constitution!" 93 His criticism
addressed Bonn's objection to sending troops to the Persian
Gulf which was based on the traditional interpretation of
the Basic Law forbidding military action out-of-area and for
other than defense purposes. German refusal to contribute
combat troops to the Gulf region, based on the
constitutional limitation, was perceived by some western
democracies as a 'side step' for not having to make a
political decision to send in troops. This criticism of
Germany's abstention from direct military involvement also
was perceived by some NATO members as an attempt to shy away
from addressing the central issue of not only changing the
Basic Law but of altering Germany's traditional stance on an
obsolete Post-Cold War security and foreign policy.
Due in part to both domestic pressure (mainly from
within Kohl's CDU/CSU party) and foreign insistence (in
which the U.S. was not the driving force) to contribute
toward the Allied effort, the Kohl government decided in the
fall of 1990 to support the coalition's military build up
primarily with financial backing. 94 The initial German
contribution was DM 3 . 3 billion earmarked for the U.S. and
93 Ibid., 91-029, 12 February 1991, "Allies Want More German
Military Action in Gulf," in AU1102130791 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in
German 11 Feb 91 P. 18-2 6.
94Mueller, p. 13 6.
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also included the transfer of state-of-the-art West German
and excess former-East German military equipment and
munitions. 95 Germany was again accused by several NATO
members of only exercising "checkbook diplomacy" and not
realistically dealing with the issue of security
burdensharing responsibilities.
As the Iraqi crisis escalated with the increased Allied
military build up, the leadership of Turkey, one of NATO's
staunch members, feared a possible attack from Iraq.
On 20 December 1990, the Turkish government requested
military defense assistance from NATO. The NATO Defense
Planning Committee decided in early January 1991 to deploy
the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force's air component
(AMF(A)) to Turkish air bases as a show of force and a
demonstration of Allied commitment to defend a NATO
member. 96
At first, Germany was hesitant to commit its military
contribution to the AMF(A) deployment. This reluctance to
dispatch German units was based on the fear of being drawn
into what many in the SPD party considered an illegal act of
provocation on NATO's part to force Iraq to retaliate in
kind if war should break out and U.S. planes specifically
95Ibid.
96Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.
52
flew offensive missions from Turkish territory. Liberal
minded members in the SPD party and some members of Kohl's
coalition considered the deployment of German combat units
to Turkey unconstitutional. The SPD, at their 1988 Party
Congress meeting, agreed on a party stance that any military
operation outside of NATO's sphere of influence was
unconstitutional and should be considered "political
adventurism.
"
97 These politicians felt that this provocative
NATO act negated the constitutional use of German troops for
strictly defensive purposes and also forfeited the legal
basis for German participation under Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty in the NATO deployment to Turkey. 98
Another important concern of the German government was
that a symbolic deployment of NATO forces to Turkey in close
proximity to the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Union would
greatly jeopardize the ongoing negotiations between Germany
and the USSR over final unification terms and the still
unratified conventional disarmament and cooperative security
treaties between western Europe and the Soviet Union. Many
politicians in Germany believed that the NATO action could
upset the delicate balance of power being formulated in
97FBIS-WEU , 90-161, 20 August 1990, p. 16, "Considered by
Kohl, Lambsdorff , " in AU1808155090 in Hamburg DIE WELT in German
18-19 Aug 90, p. 1.
"Mueller, p. 137.
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Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War and German
unification.
"
Chancellor Kohl strongly believed that Germany had a
legal and moral responsibility to uphold the NATO security
commitment to safeguard Turkey's territorial integrity from
a potential Iraqi attack. He argued that for the past forty
years the NATO members' steadfast defense commitment had
ensured West Germany's continued existence in the face of a
Soviet invasion threat and that likewise, Germany must
demonstrate its loyalty and reliability to the same ideals
by acting in accordance with the provisions of the North
Atlantic Treaty. 100 Furthermore, the action was covered after
a clear mandate was issued by the UN to allow for the use of
military force in stopping Iraqi aggression. 101 After a top
level meeting on 2 January 1991, attended by the department
heads of the Defense, Foreign, Justice and Interior
Ministries, a decision was reached on the deployment of
military personnel to Turkey. The SPD claim that military
action under the aegis of NATO was unconstitutional was
"Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.
100Ibid.
101This UN mandate specifically pertains to UN resolution
678, passed on 29 November 1990, which authorized member states
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement UN Resolution
660, which demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally
withdraw all its forces from Kuwait.
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rejected outright by the Kohl government. The troop
deployment to Turkey within the framework of the Alliance
was considered legal under Article 24 of the Basic Law which
offered the possibility of relinquishing sovereign rights to
international institutions 102 and Article 87(a) for defense
purposes (of a NATO partner) and as explicitly permitted by
the Basic Law.
In the second week of January 1991, Germany deployed a
squadron of 18 Alpha Jets with ground support personnel as
part of the German contribution to the AMC(A) to Erhac Air
Base in Southeastern Turkey. 103 In addition, in late January,
the decision was made to send anti-air defense units to
Turkey for the purpose of protecting the Bundeswehr aviation
combat units already stationed in Turkey. 104 German-manned
Roland and Hawk missile batteries were sent to Turkey in
February 1991 which brought the total troop deployment up to
1600 Bundeswehr personnel in Turkey. 105 The Bonn government
also approved the transfer of U.S. $5.5 billion to cover
102FBIS-VJEU , 91-002, 3 January 1991, p. 13, "SPD Stand on
Using Army in Turkey Rejected, " in LD0201145491 Berlin ADN in
German 1415 GMT 2 Jan 91.
103Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.
104FBIS-WEU , 91-020, 30 January 1991, p. 7, "Missiles to
Turkey, " in LD2 9 0117 0491 Hamburg DPA in German 1600 GMT
29 Jan 91.
105Ibid., "German Soldiers in Turkey to Total 1,600," in
LD2901174491 Berlin ADN in German 1709 GMT 29 Jan 91.
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military costs during the first three months of 1991.
Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel stated that this action
was to show a "clear sign of solidarity with the United
States [-led effort]." 106
A ZDF Political Barometer Poll conducted in Germany
shortly after the war started showed that 48% responded that
German soldiers should get involved if Turkey was to be
attacked and 47% said Germany should not get involved. 107
Even after the commencement of hostilities, a clear majority
did not favor German involvement even if a NATO member's
defense was at stake. However, 75% of the respondents
agreed with the Allied military action in the Gulf War.
Only 21% did not approve of the offensive operation. 108
In another opinion poll conducted for the German
magazine PER SPIEGEL by the Emnid Opinion Research Institute
from 21 through 23 January 1991, 66% of those surveyed
stated that the military intervention of the United States
106Ibid
107Ibid., 91-019, 29 January 1991, p. 6, "Germans Back Gulf
War, Split on Sending Troops," in AU2901104991 Hamburg DIE WELT
in German 2 9 Jan 91, p. 1.
108 Ibid.
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and its Allies was necessary after the expiration of the UN
mandated ultimatum for the Iraqi withdrawal of Kuwait. 109
Additionally, the Wickert Opinion Research Institute, in its
poll, reported that only 10% of the citizens polled opposed
the Gulf War. 110 Public sentiment was clearly in favor of the
Allied military effort, yet a consensus was still not formed
on the extent to which German Armed Forces should be
involved in the war. Cold War attitudes of traditional
German security policy were still prevalent in a large
proportion of German society.
A change of opinion took place within Germany after
Israel was attacked on 18 January 1991 by SCUD missiles
launched from Iraq. An overwhelming majority of Germans
called upon the Bonn government to come to Israel defense.
The attitudinal shift was based in part on the historical
guilt felt by many Germans about the destruction of Jews
during Hitler's reign of terror and the allegations that
German industries assisted Iraq in the build up of its
chemical weapons arsenal and missile technology. 111
109Ibid., "Poll Reflects Opinions About Gulf War, USSR," in
AU2801181791 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jan 91, p. 32-38.
The breakdown of the 66% majority opinion was that 81% of the
CDU/CSU and FDP respondents and 52% of the SPD respondents
answered the question affirmatively.
110Ibid.
niKaiser and Becher, p. 50.
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On 3 January 1991, Mr. Kohl announced a defense pledge to
Israel of DM 800 million. 112 This package included Patriot
anti-air defense missiles with German technicians to train
the Israeli forces on their use, chemical protective
equipment (German state-of-the-art fuchs sniffer vehicles)
,
medical supplies, financing for two German manufactured
submarines 113 and DM 250 million in humanitarian aid. 114
This shift in attitudes and behavior toward a more active
role beyond the front-line defense of German and NATO
borders strengthened the Kohl coalition government position
of providing a responsible contribution toward new
multilateral approaches in the changing domestic and
international political arenas. 115
The total sum of German contributions in the Persian
Gulf War far surpassed the perception that Germany only
engaged in "check book diplomacy". The value of the entire
German contribution to the Gulf effort was approximately
DM 18,000 million. More than half of the contribution
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p. 51.
114Mueller, p. 137-138.
115Kaiser and Becher, p. 50.
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(DM 10,200 million) was earmarked specifically for the
United States. 116 In addition, Israel, Turkey, France,
Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands received large
contributions in money, materiel, supplies, spare parts,
munitions and transportation support. 117
The FRG gave almost unlimited access to Allied forces
enroute through Germany to the Gulf. Germany's naval
contribution was sizeable in filling the gaps created in the
Mediterranean Sea by Allied navies deploying from this
region into the Persian Gulf. A seven ship detachment
(later sent to the Persian Gulf to sweep for mines) was
dispatched to a NATO base on the island of Crete to assist
in protecting shipping lanes on the NATO Southern Flank.
In February 1991, two frigates, two destroyers and two
supply ships were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea to
bolster NATO's presence. In addition, three naval maritime
patrol aircraft and an additional frigate were also
dispatched to augment NATO's Standing Naval Force Channel in
the Eastern Mediterranean region. 118
116Ibid., p. 55.
117German contributions amounted to: Israel-DM 800 million,
Turkey-DM 1,500 million, France-DM 300 million, Great Britain-
DM 800 million, lesser amounts to Italy, the Netherlands and
DM 2,500 million in economic assistance to the 'front line'
states of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia.
118Kaiser and Becher, p. 53.
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Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia received
economic aid to offset the effects of the economic embargo
placed on Iraq by the UN and other regional organizations.
Germany also contributed in the environmental clean up
effort of the war-ravaged region after the cessation of
hostilities. 119 Before the end of the war, German taxpayers
contributed the equivalent of more than one third of the
annual German defense budget to the Allied effort. 120 A
sample of the German pledge ranged from 79 fuchs NBC
detection vehicles, an excess of 315,000 rounds of tank and
artillery ammunition, 2,000 radio sets, 600 shower-bath
vehicles, 220 10-ton trucks, 120 heavy duty tractors with
20-ton trailers, 200 heavy flat-bed trailers, 100,000 NBC
suits (to Israel), 80 Leopard-1 main battle tanks (to
Turkey) , and access to the five largest Bundeswehr hospitals
in Germany. 121
A total of 3,200 military personnel deployed from
Germany in support of Operations Desert Shield and Storm. 122
Only Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Japan contributed more
119 Ibid., p. 55.
120Mueller, p. 13;
121FBIS-WEU , 91-029, 12 February 1991, p. 7-8, "Details of
Military Assistance to Gulf Allies," in 91P20182A Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Feb 91 p. 6.
122Mueller, p. 138.
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financially to the U.S. in Operation Desert Storm. The
German pledge amounted to 12.2% of the total cost. 123 The
accusations made by some Allies that Germany did not
adequately contribute to the Gulf War effort are erroneous
in light of the total sum of the FRG ' s defense pledge.
Nevertheless, the FRG was not prepared to send combat
troops into the Gulf region to fight in Operation Desert
Storm. However, the Persian Gulf War became the decisive
political fulcrum in changing attitudes toward a greater
burdensharing role for the Bundeswehr in the Post-Cold War
era. The Soviet Union's leadership specifically told
members of Kohl's government not to participate in the
combat operations in the Persian Gulf. 124 In January 1991,
only after the Soviet Union supported the UN-mandated
coalition's call for military action against Iraq, were
German politicians ready to begin serious debate to alter
traditional limits on the participation of German military
forces beyond the NATO guaranteed area. 125




124Dr. Donald Abenheim (recalling Foreign Minister Genscher's
response after his speech to the Bundeswehr on 4 April 1992 to
the question of Soviet influence on German decision making during
the Gulf crisis), interview by author, 2 November 1993, Naval
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A process of rethinking Germany's national interests,
its proper role as a "normalized and fully sovereign" state
and its responsibilities to preserve peace as a member of
the global community was undertaken as a result of German
unpreparedness in dealing with the issues of defense and use
of military force in the Persian Gulf War. 126 After the war,
Chancellor Kohl commented at a Bundestag session that,
"We have dedicated ourselves to the side of freedom, law and
justice during the Gulf conflict, using such means as were
available in accord with our constitution." 127 The debate on
out-of-area military missions evolved into the current
debate over a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr. The
lesson of the Gulf War for German politicians was that the
central issue in the debate over military involvement beyond
traditional limits directly concerned the course German
security responsibilities and foreign policy should take in
the "New World Order" and in defining Germany's national
identity in the Post-Cold War era. 128
After the Persian Gulf War, the issue of Germany's
participation in UN military actions, both armed and unarmed
missions, dominated the debate over a new German security
126Ibid., p. 57.
127Mueller, p. 138-139.
128 Ibid., p. 139.
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and foreign policy stance. 129 As a result of German reticence
in the Persian Gulf War, the formulation of a new German
security policy and the debate surrounding the use of the
military as a tool of foreign policy intensified due to
catastrophic events in Yugoslavia. The Balkan crisis
transformed the political dilemma of dealing with conflicts
on a distant horizon to one of a more immediate concern due
to the close proximity of the civil war in Yugoslavia. The
threat of the regional conflict spreading further into
Europe pressed the peacekeeping debate and the use of
military force into the forefront of the German national
political system.
Due to the pressing issue of mending a divided country,
the Persian Gulf War caught Germany's leadership and its
citizens completely off guard. For the first time in over
forty years, German politicians were confronted with a
security crisis, far removed from the traditional threat,
which greatly impacted on German society and the
Government's foreign policy. Operation Desert Storm was a
turning point in the Post-Cold War era which signified the
necessity to redefine Germany's role in security
burdensharing responsibilities and its national identity in
129FBIS-WEU , 92-192, 2 October 1992, p. 13, "Article Analyzes
Future Foreign Policy Goals," in 92GE0528A Hamburg DEUTSCHES
ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German no. 35, 28 Aug 92, p. 4.
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a new multi-polar environment. If Germany was to assume an
equal position among the more mature western democracies,
then a re-interpretation on the use of military force for
maintaining peace and stability in areas beyond German
borders was required.
Operation Desert Storm, being the first major Post-Cold
War conflict, highlighted the inadequacies of Germany's
foreign and security policy in dealing with conflicts on
distant horizons. In the transitional period from one
historical paradigm to a new era of a changing international
security environment, characterized by uncertainty and
instability, states and organizations were forced to modify
out-dated policy and ways of thinking to safeguard national
interests and regional peace. The simultaneous events of the
Persian Gulf War and unification did not allow adequate time
for Germany's politicians to alter old security policies to
better manage the challenges of the new political
environment
.
The process of redefining the obsolete frontline defense
strategy was further hastened by the rise in nationalism of
the Balkans. A sense of urgency in assuming new roles for
the Bundeswehr increased due to the close proximity of the
Yugoslav crisis. However, the necessary consensus on
adopting a peacekeeping and combat role was still not
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possible due to the historical legacy of past indiscretions
and a long standing policy of reticence.
A change in fundamental perceptions of how the Armed
Forces should be used as a tool of foreign policy in the
changing security environment must be reached within a clear
majority of society. The government inadequately attempted
to shape foreign and security policy during the Persian Gulf
War in order for Germany to assume a greater influence in
regional and global affairs. However, Germany's actions in
the Persian Gulf War were an awkward first step in the
process of reforming foreign policy and the proper role of
the Bundeswehr
.
As a result of the immediacy of crises closer to the
Fatherland as well as distant conflicts impacting on the
collective defense and security organizations to which
Germany was a member, the formulation of security policy
required further clarification. The collective actions of
the UN and NATO at resolving the Balkan crisis created
further debate on the extent of German participation in not
only out-of-area operations, but peacekeeping and combat
missions as well. The UN operation in Somalia proved to be
another qualitative step toward re-interpreting Germany's
role in the changing security environment. The distinctions
between humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat missions were
greatly blurred in the factional Somalian war in which UN
65
troops were deployed. The Bundeswehr became a tool of
foreign policy that still lacked a sense of legitimacy. In
addition, the German government's decision to take part in
military actions in both the Balkans and Somalia possessed
neither a solid political consensus nor the requisite
overwhelming support of the German people.
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IV. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The Persian Gulf War ushered in a new era of Post-Cold
War conflicts in which multi-lateral action became the trend
in military enforcement. the use of military force did not
diminish with the shift in the balance of power. On the
contrary, the evolving multi-polar system was viewed as
inherently more unstable than the old East-West dichotomy.
Peace and stability in regions formerly controlled by the
Communist regimes were increasingly becoming less secure.
The rise in nationalism, ethnic strife and religious
fundamentalism played a major role in changing the
international security environment.
Stable democratic countries, like Germany and Japan,
were placed in the new position of having to protect
national interests within their regional areas. The
redefinition of national security and foreign policy took a
qualitative jump as a result of events closer to the
periphery of NATO and Germany itself. The need to re-
examine old Cold War doctrine and cast off the obsolete
portions to formulate appropriate responses to new threats
became increasingly important. The debate on using the
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Armed Forces in non-traditional missions such as
peacekeeping and extra-territorial combat operations
highlighted the sense of urgency within the Kohl government
to assist in the positive outcome of crises within the
European security environment and beyond.
On the last day of the Persian Gulf War, during a
ZDF studio interview, Chancellor Kohl (CDU) was asked if he
was in favor of German troops being dispatched to the Gulf
region. He replied:
Now that the war is over, we should calmly sit together
and discuss the necessary constitutional amendments. I
am in favor of such constitutional amendments. We are
not responsible for the way our Basic Law was formulated
in 1949. Many of those who criticize us now, including
people in Western capitols, had a substantial interest
at that time in the German constitution containing such
restrictions. However, being a country of 80 million
people, a country with a strong economy, and a UN member
[since 1973] enjoying all the rights involved, but
keeping in the background when duties have to be
fulfilled; I would propose amending the constitution.
I advocate doing so now, and not when there is a war.
We should do what is necessary now within the framework
of the United Nations. 130
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FDP
party, during a BBC 2 Newsnight program interview, echoed
Chancellor Kohl's call for a constitutional amendment.
Genscher commented, "yes, we do opt for this [ ; ] me
130Ibid., 91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 8, "Kohl Interviewed About
German Role in Gulf," in AU0103145391 Mainz ZDF Television
Network in German 1900 GMT 28 Feb 91.
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personally, and the Federal government." 131 He further stated
in an interview with WELT AM SQNNTAG , that the government
coalition was ready to make changes to the Basic Law. 132
Mr. Genscher stated, after the war, that an amendment
permitting military participation in all UN-mandated
operations (similar to the UN Gulf resolution) would have
allowed German troops to directly contribute to the
coalition against Iraq. 133 Federal President Richard von
Weizaecker also welcomed a change to the Basic Law allowing
German soldiers to participate in UN peacekeeping
missions . 134
In anticipation of war breaking out in the Persian Gulf,
the SPD denounced the potential use of German Armed Forces
in combat. This pacifist view was further spelled out after
the Gulf War in the SPD Bremen party conference resolution
in May 1991. At the conference, an SPD majority agreed to
131Ibid., 91-023, 4 February 1991, p. 23, "Genscher Defends
Contribution to Gulf Effort," in PM0102164691 London BBC
Television Network in English 2230 GMT 30 Jan 91.
132 Ibid., "Constitution Amendment Discussed," in LD0202121591
Berlin ADN in German 1112 GMT 2 Feb 91.
133 Ibid., 91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 11, "Genscher on German
Role, Aftermath in Gulf," in AU0103144891 Dusseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 1 Mar 91 p. 4.
134 Ibid. ; 91-052, 18 March 1991, p. 16, "Weizaecker Favors
Military Role in UN Missions," in LD1703092191 Hamburg DPA
0743 GMT 17 Mar 91.
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permit only Bundeswehr peacekeeping missions. 135 Originally
taking a hard line stance against military involvement in
UN-commanded or sanctioned operations, the SPD acquiesced to
only allow specific participation outside the NATO area for:
UN peacekeeping missions with mixed civilian/military
personnel, UN observer missions, and overseeing UN truces. 136
Furthermore, the SPD saw an amendment to the Basic Law, to
allow for more than peacekeeping missions, as inconsistent
with their peace and security policy position. The SPD
leadership argued that peacekeeping deployments could only
be possible if a Basic Law amendment was first approved to
allow Blue Helmet operations. 137
In an effort to show that his coalition government was
willing to adapt to the changed international security
environment, Chancellor Kohl carried out several post-Gulf
War decisions directly related to German military
participation beyond traditional boundaries. In March 1991
after the war's end, a German naval mine-sweeping unit was
dispatched to the Persian Gulf to assist in the clean up of
135Ibid., 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to
Bundeswehr ' s Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER
SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-2 9.
136John Tagliabue, "Kohl Opposed on Troops Outside NATO
Area," New York Times , 2 June 1991, p. 112.
137FBIS-WEU , 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to
Bundeswehr" s Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER
SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-29.
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the Iraqi mines. The Kohl government defended its decision
to deploy the naval units as a humanitarian mission that did
not conflict with constitutional limitations. 138 Yet, the
seven ship Bundesmarine (German Federal Navy) detachment
signified the first step toward greater German military
involvement beyond the traditional parameters of the
obsolete Cold War security policy. 139
One month later, in April 1993, German military aviation
and engineering units participated in Operation Provide
Comfort in Turkey and Iran to assist the humanitarian effort
of relocating the Iraqi Kurds back into their homeland after
Saddam Hussein's army forced them across the border into
neighboring Turkey. 140 Chancellor Kohl sent 2,000 troops,
airlifted by the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) , to the
Turkish/ Iranian border to help build refugee camps for the
persecuted Iraqi Kurds. 141 Although the SPD agreed to back
the Bundeswehr ' s new role outside of traditional NATO bounds
for humanitarian reasons, these military actions slowly
138 Ibid.
139Ibid., 91-047, 11 March 1991, p. 7, "Minesweeping Unit
Departs Crete for Persian Gulf," in LD1103114191 Hamburg DPA in
German 1040 GMT 11 Mar 91.
140Kaiser and Becher, p. 54.
141Marc Fisher, "Germany to Send Troops to Iran to Aid
Refugees," Washington Post , 24 April 1991, p. A23
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edged Germany closer toward a looser interpretation of the
constitutional ban.
With the downfall of Communism in eastern Europe and the
break up of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) , the FRG played a pivotal role in
the middle of Europe. Many of the break away former Soviet
Union republics and the former Warsaw Pact central European
countries began to look to Germany for financial assistance.
Germany, although in the midst of internal unification
itself, was seen by many of the nascent eastern European
states as the means to turn their command-style economies
into free market systems similar to the prosperous Western
models and to help reform both obsolete and corrupt
government systems and military institutions. As a
normalized and fully sovereign nation, the FRG began to
assume greater influence within the European region of
states. German Cold War security policies gave way to
increasing levels of engagement with the newly democratic
countries of east and central Europe through cooperative
ventures in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
and within the CSCE.
Foreign Minister Genscher argued that the established
political contacts among the former WTO members should be
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enlarged. 142 He sought to shape foreign policy goals without
having to resort to the use of military force in the future
if possible. He, along with U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker, originated the idea of forming a North Atlantic
Cooperation Council under the auspices of NATO and on
2 October 1991, they issued a joint statement calling for
affirmation on their proposal. 143 The German government view
held that the NACC was a kind of formalized structure needed
to prevent instability and promote cooperation between the
democracies of eastern and western Europe. 144 A common belief
held by many in the Foreign Ministry, at that time, was that
east European instability would affect west European (and
German) political and economic stability. 145
As previously noted, the start of World War I originated
in the Balkans due to ethnic conflict. The outcome of
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Germany's defeat in World War I caused severe hardship
within the Fatherland that also led to the rise of Nazism
and another even more horrific World War. The World War II
German occupation of Yugoslavia was no less brutal than any
of the other east European countries invaded by the German
Wehrmacht . Germany's actions in the Balkans during the
Second World War were not easily forgotten by the affected
Yugoslav populace.
Germany's historical legacy in the Balkan region was one
of violent invasion, ethnic cleansing, occupation and
subjugation. The Nazi regime instilled a fear and hatred of
German soldiers that was still evident within the Balkan
region in the Post-Cold War era. For this reason alone,
German politicians were extremely hesitant to embark on a
foreign policy of armed intervention in the violent affairs
of Yugoslavia and its break away republics without stirring
up dormant feelings of guilt within German society. Yet,
the post-Cold War crisis within Yugoslavia began to affect
the west European states ' interests of maintaining regional
stability.
The need to resolve the violence or at least contain it
from spreading into the more developed and stable west
European states became apparent to the members of NATO and
the European Community. If these organizations were to
maintain their usefulness in resolving regional conflict and
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safeguarding the well being of member states, then decisive
and preventive action was necessary in quelling the Balkan
unrest. Germany, as a member of both organizations, was in
the untenable situation of advocating collective security
action by these institutions, yet, at the same time, the FRG
was not in a position to offer any direct assistance in
military operations. The need to become more active in
managing regional conflicts was in direct contrast to the
internal divisiveness of altering traditional attitudes of
never again being perceived as the belligerent in areas like
the Balkans
.
The growing concern among German politicians was that
the FRG again might be drawn into another similar situation
if the internal Yugoslavian turmoil was not resolved
quickly. Yet, due to the historical legacy of Germany's
role in the region during World War II, the FRG was not in a
politically, let alone militarily, tenable position to
initiate a resolution to the Balkan unrest. Unlike the
Persian Gulf War, which was seen as a conflict on the
distant horizon, the violent unrest within the Balkans was
viewed more as a immediate European problem. Furthermore,
Germany's leadership was fearful of repeating history by




The growing crisis in Yugoslavia was a prime example of
a civil war erupting into a regional conflict with far
reaching repercussions. In August 1991, the Kohl government
made overtures to the break away republics of Croatia and
Slovenia to formally recognize them as independent and
sovereign states. 146 The intended hope of this recognition by
Germany was to allow the countries of Slovenia and Croatia
the ability to formally request assistance from the UN or
other regional organizations in stopping the aggressive
moves by primarily Serbia against their sovereign territory.
The German plan for recognition was premature and misguided
in the view of the European Community (EC) without first
ensuring the republics met a complex set of guidelines laid
out by the EC that included verification of human rights
conditions. In particular, France and Great Britain voiced
strong criticism that the FRG ' s headstrong recognition would
create further instability in the region which would spread
elsewhere within Europe. Regardless of the complaints of
France, Great Britain, the U.S. and the UN Secretary
General, Germany formally recognized the sovereignty of
Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991. 147
146
"Countdown to Recognition, " The Economist , 21 December
1991, p. 57.
147
"Wreckognition, " The Economist , 18 January 1992, p. 49
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In being the first to recognize the break away republics
of Croatia and Slovenia, a fully sovereign Germany flexed
its Post-Cold War foreign and security policy muscle and
attempted to provide a stronger international leverage
against Serbian aggression. Germany's decision to influence
the international political scene forced the rest of the EC
states to maintain a sense of European solidarity and show a
concerted effort to solve the Balkan dispute. 148 Upon
Germany's early insistence on recognizing the breakaway
republics of Croatia and Slovenia, the 12 nation EC
begrudgingly was compelled to follow suit. 149
Croatia's Foreign Minister, Zvonimir Separovic,
commented that, "after recognition, Slovenia and Croatia
will be exactly the same as Kuwait in the Persian Gulf
crisis ... [the Balkan dispute] will no longer be seen as just
a civil war or the internal affairs of Yugoslavia." 150 The
West, according to Mr. Separovic, would have a moral and
legal obligation to safeguard and defend Croatia's
independence and sovereignty. Croatian leaders assumed the
148Craig R. Whitney, "As Germany Flexes Its Muscles, the New
Europe Goes Along," New York Times , 17 December 1991, Sec. IV,
p. 4.
149John Tagliabue, "European Ties for Slovenia and Croatia,
"
New York Times , 12 December 1991, p. A3.
150Stephen Engelberg, "Germany Raising Hopes of Croatia, " New
York Times , 12 December 1991, A6
.
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next step would be to send arms or Western military forces
to intervene on Croatia's behalf. Yet when Germany was
asked by the UN Secretary General to contribute forces for a
peacekeeping mission to the Balkan region, the FRG
refused. 151
Chancellor Kohl's two key Ministers directly involved in
formulating Germany's security policy resigned their
positions within two months of each other. Gerhard
Stoltenberg, Minister of Defense (MOD) since 1989, stepped
down on 31 March 1992 in the midst of an illicit arms
transfer scandal that he felt would damage Chancellor Kohl's
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition if he had remained in his post. 152 The
SPD previously called for Stoltenberg ' s resignation in
December 1991 for the secret shipment of excess former East
German weapons. 153 Stoltenberg claimed that the weapons were
shipped without his prior knowledge and that he was unaware
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153FBIS-WEU , 91-235, 6 December 1991, p. 14, "SPD Wants
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154Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms
Scandal, " p. A25.
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Traditionally, the Minister of Defense position has been
a comparatively vulnerable and weak post in initiating a
forward looking security policy within the executive branch
due to the history of Defense Minister resignations and
firings associated with various scandals and poor
performance. In peacetime, the Defense Minister is the
overall commander of the Bundeswehr and acts as the supreme
administrative authority of all servicemen. 155 The Defense
Minister's power over the military is viewed as a symbol of
the primacy of civilian control, to include the daily
functions of the Bundeswehr, over the military. 156 In
addition, Article 115b of the Basic Law dictates that only
when a state of defense is officially declared does the
power of command over the Armed Forces pass to the
Chancellor. 157 The Defense Minister's role was structurally
established to be a very strong security policy decision
making position within the political system.
However, the political reality of the Minister of
Defense post showed that the position was less influential
than the Foreign Minister and Chancellor in determining
155
"The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed
Forces," White Paper 1985 , German Ministry of Defense, 19 June
1985, p. 165.
156Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told
Tale, " p. 91.
157Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany , p. 72.
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security policy. To a certain extent, even the General
Inspector and the Armed Service Chiefs became political
players in formulating security policy and behavior and in
accepting responsibility for the functions of the Defense
Ministry. 158 Only three of the ten Defense Ministers were
termed "activists" with recognized expertise on security
matters and clear cut ideas for policy actions. 159 Defense
Minister Stoltenberg stayed firmly in the background during
Germany's struggle to redefine its military and diplomatic
policy in the Post-Cold War period. 160
The latest scandal that ousted Stoltenberg involved the
illegal transfer of 15 Leopard main battle tanks to Turkey
after the German Parliament banned shipments of arms to
Turkey after confirmation that previous shipments of German
weapons were used in attacks by Turkish troops against the
minority Kurdish population of Turkey. This action by
Turkey, along with accusations by Germany of human rights
violations by the Ankara government against the Kurds,
caused a halt in arms sales to Turkey by one of its main
158Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told
Tale, " p. 96.
159 Ibid.
,
p. 92. The three activists were Franz Josef
Strauss (CSU) from 1956 to 1962, Helmut Schmidt (SPD) from 1969
to 1972 and Manfred Woerner (CDU) from 1982 to 1988.
160Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms
Scandal, " p. A2 5
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suppliers of weapons and the parliamentary ban on future
arms transfers. 161 Stoltenberg, 63, was compelled to resign
since he bore overall responsibility for the actions of his
subordinates, even if he was not aware of their illegal
activity. As Hans-Ulrich Klose, parliamentary leader of the
SPD, stated, "He [Stoltenberg] is clearly not in control [of
the Defense Ministry] anymore." 162
CDU party manager, Volker Ruehe, was picked by Kohl to
replace Stoltenberg as Defense Minister. Mr. Ruehe, a
former English teacher, took over his defense position with
the intent to push Germany toward a greater role in global
security responsibilities. 163 Mr. Ruehe, 49, was termed as
one of Germany's most U. S . -oriented politicians and was
critical not of his predecessor, but of Foreign Minister
Genscher. Mr. Ruehe was considered to be an Atlanticist
where as Mr. Genscher was termed an ambivalent Euro-
centrist. Mr. Ruehe felt that Mr. Genscher, Foreign
Minister since 1974, was ineffective and not in touch with
the political reality and "the trends in a changing
161Stephen Kinzer, "Turks Got Tanks, and German Minister Must
Quit," New York Times , 1 April 1992, p. A3.
162 Ibid.
163Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms
Scandal, " p. A25.
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world." 164 Mr. Ruehe also did not hide the fact that he had
previously made overtures to Kohl that he wanted to fill the
position of Foreign Minister when it became vacant. Defense
Minister Ruehe planned to exercise greater influence than
his predecessors in shaping foreign and security policy upon
assumption of his office. 165
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on 17 May 1992, after exactly
18 years in office, resigned his position as Foreign
Minister. He stated, "after such a long time in office,
I think the time has come to give up the of f ice. . .voluntar-
ily. " 166 Mr. Genscher was hailed as one of the most popular
political leaders in Germany. He was elected to Parliament
in 1965, served as Interior Minister in 1969 and in 1974
became Foreign Minister under the SPD-FDP coalition
government of Helmut Schmidt. He was the world's senior
Foreign Minister upon his resignation. 167 Throughout his
tenure in office he dealt with such personalities as U.S.
164 Ibid.
165Ibid.
166Marc Fisher, "Germany's Genscher Stepping Down After 18
Years as Foreign Minister," The Washington Post , 28 April 1992,
p. A17.
167Stephen Kinzer, "Genscher, Bonn's Foreign Minister 18
Years, Resigns," New York Times , 28 April 1992, p. A3
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign
Minister Anatoly Gromyko . 168
At the end of his term in office, Mr. Genscher was
largely credited with playing a crucial role in the
unification of East and West Germany and the efforts at
designing a European unity plan. In his article entitled,
"Ten Points for Continuity in Foreign Policy of the Unified
Germany, " published in WELT AM SONNTAG , Mr. Genscher stated
that, "after amending our constitution. .. [a] unified Germany
is ready and willing to accept its responsibility for
safeguarding world peace within the framework of the United
Nations." 169 Mr. Genscher, 65, contemplated resigning as
early as the first of the year but wanted to wait until his
anniversary before publicly announcing his intentions to
step down.
Mr. Genscher ' s resignation stemmed from his desire to
leave office on a high note and not have to deal with the
messy aftermath of unification, the growing economic
problems and having to redefine a new role for Germany in
the Post-Cold War security environment. Mr. Genscher was
also criticized for his role in pushing for early
168 ii As Germany Goes," New York Times , 30 April 1992, p. A22
169FBIS-WEU , 92-087, 5 May 1992, p. 21, "Genscher Cites
'Basic Constants'," in AU0405152692 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in
German 3 May 1992, p. 9.
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recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the indecisive role
played by Germany in the Persian Gulf War. His associates
said that both of these controversies, not to mention two
previous heart attacks, factored into his decision to resign
his post. 170 He also delayed his resignation until after he
was sure that Kohl's protege, Volker Ruehe, would not assume
his position as Foreign Minister. 171
Justice Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) was chosen by the
FDP Parliamentary members by vote of 63 to 25 to be the FDP
candidate to succeed Genscher as Foreign Minister. 172 This
vote was carried out after the FDP party members rejected an
earlier decision by the FDP leadership to name Mrs. Irmgard
Schwaetzer, Housing Minister, as the first woman Foreign
Minister. Mrs. Schwaetzer was not considered a strong nor
experienced enough leader to handle the key position in the
Kohl coalition. 173 Mr. Kinkel, on the other hand, was
considered by his party members as "an innovative thinker
who does not stand on tradition for its own sake." 174
170Kinzer, "Genscher, Bonn's Foreign Minister 18 Years,
Resigns, " p. A3
.
171Fisher, "Germany's Genscher Stepping Down After 18 Years
as Foreign Minister," p. A17
.
172Stephen Kinzer, "Party in Bonn Rebels on Genscher 's





Mr. Kinkel, the former head of the German Secret Service,
maintained a reputation for imaginative leadership and
astute professionalism in carrying out tough tasks within
the Justice and Interior Ministry. 175 Mr. Kinkel, who
thought of himself as the son to Genscher's father figure,
stated, "we [the Kohl government] shall continue to pursue a
reliable, constructive and predictable foreign policy ... open
to new challenges." 176
Within the Kohl government, a redefinition of foreign
and security policy was undertaken that fueled the political
debate on the extent to which German military units should
take part in not only out of area missions, but in
peacekeeping and potential peacemaking missions. With the
change in the Post-Cold War security environment, came an
internal generational change in Germany's leadership that
also sparked a change in the formulation of German foreign
and security interests and policy. Defense Minister Ruehe
and Foreign Minister Kinkel, representing not only their
positions in government, but their respective parties as
well, both stated that Germany must adapt to the changing
political and security environment.
175Ibid
176FBIS-WEU , 92-107, 3 June 1992, p. 13, "Says Give Sanctions
Chance, " in LD0206170392 London BBC Television Network in English
213 GMT 1 Jun 92.
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The Yugoslavian crisis was their first test of
formulating a responsive foreign and security policy to meet
the challenge of ensuring peace and stability within the
European community of states. The call to militarily
enforce the UN-mandated embargo on weapons entering Bosnia
and Montenegro from the Adriatic Sea forced the Kohl
government to take action within the multi-lateral framework
of the NATO alliance and the Western European Union. The
use of German military forces in the Adriatic Sea mission
assumed another qualitative jump in engaging German foreign
and security policy outside the traditional realm of
involvement without first obtaining a clear consensus from
the political parties and German society.
A. ADRIATIC SEA MISSION
In the case of the growing crisis in Yugoslavia, Foreign
Minister Kinkel spoke out against German soldiers taking
part, "if at all possible," in any European intervention in
the conflict. He based this position on the historical
legacy of German soldiers occupying the area during World
War II and the resentment that would ensue among the local
populace if Bundeswehr troops were to deploy to Yugoslavia
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again. 177 However, Kinkel did not give up hope that a Basic
Law amendment could be achieved that was more far reaching
than what the SPD proposed. He reiterated that, "Germany-
will not be able to afford to watch world events from the
spectator stand despite and particularly in view of its
past... while constantly keeping in mind what has happened in
the past, we must commit ourselves to a greater extent." 178
In July 1992, despite the ongoing debate on the Basic
Law, Mr. Kohl decided to take part in the European effort at
solving the Balkan crisis by dispatching navy units to
contribute to the UN supervision of the embargo against
Serbia and Montenegro. 179 He reiterated that the role of the
naval task force was solely to observe shipping and to pass
information on to the UN. He acknowledged that his decision
entered a gray area of interpreting the Basic Law. By
contributing a destroyer to the Adriatic Sea mission,
177 Ibid., "No Troops for Yugoslavia," in LD0206112692 Hamburg
DPA in German 1037 GMT 2 Jun 92.
178 Ibid., 92-124, 26 June 1992, p. 21, "Kinkel Discusses EC,
Serbia, Security Policy," in AU2506173092 Frankfurt /Main
FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 5 Jun 92, p. 7.
179Ibid., 92-136, 15 July 1992, p. 15, "Navy To Aid
Supervision of UN Embargo on Serbia", in LD150710392 Hamburg DPA
in German 0916 GMT 15 Jul 92.
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Mr. Kohl not only symbolically supported the UN embargo, but
also fueled the debate for an amendment change to permit
peacekeeping missions beyond the NATO guaranteed area. 180
The Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees met
in a special joint session on 16 July 1992 to discuss the
Adriatic role of the Bundeswehr. The debate devolved into
the basic question of future out-of-area missions of the
military and the relevant constitutional restrictions. The
SPD was seriously considering a constitutional challenge to
the government's action, yet there was disagreement within
the SPD on this method of limiting military power projection
in NATO out-of-area deployments. Not all members of the SPD
felt the government was modifying its foreign and defense
policy in a de facto manner and fostering the perception
that out-of-area operations were proper and legal. 181
However, the SPD still balked at committing military troops
to the Balkan crisis. The SPD threatened to pursue legal
recourse, through the Federal Constitutional Court in
180Francine S. Kiefer, "Germany Tiptoes Toward Greater Use of
Military", The Christian Science Monitor , 16 July 1992, p. 3.
181FBIS-WEU , 92-146, 29 July 1992, p. 5-6, "SPD Seeks
Constitutional Ruling on Deployment, " in 92GE043 5A Frankfurt /Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, in German 17 Jul 92, p. 1-2.
Karlsruhe, if a Government decision to act militarily was
carried out. 182
Bonn stopped short of deploying military forces to the
Balkans primarily because the constitutional interpretation
forbid such actions but more importantly due to the historic
legacy of Germany's World War II occupation of Yugoslavia. 183
In regard to the Balkan issue and Germany's evolving Post-
Cold War security policy, Defense Minister Volker Ruehe
commented, "How do you want to build Europe, when German
ships on principle steer a different course from ships of
all other nations?" 184
FDP Parliamentary Manager Werner Hoyer requested that
the SPD alter its view on passing an amendment to allow
UN-mandated missions by the Bundeswehr
.
185 Foreign Minister
Kinkel also implored the SPD to give up its rejection of an
amendment and to come to terms with permitting German
182 Ibid., 92-144, 27 July 1992, p. 8, "Commentary Views
Political Risks of Adriatic Role, " in 92GE0433A Hamburg
DIE ZEIT in German No. 30, 17 Jul 92, p. 1.
183 Ibid., 92-156, 12 August 1992, p. 6, "Kinkel Calls for
Opposition to Serbia, " in LD1108132192 Berlin DDP in German
1253 GMT 11 Aug 92.
184 Ibid., 92-152, 6 August 1992, p. 7, "SPD Fails to Split
Coalition on Security Issues, " in 92GE0450A Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 23 Jul 92, p. 3.
185Ibid., 92-154, 10 August 1992, p. 8, "Kinkel Advocates,
SPD Rejects Combat Missions," in AU0708164492 Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 7 Aug 92, p. 1-2.
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military use, not only for Blue Helmet missions, but beyond.
When the UN Secretary General requested German assistance in
contributing armed forces to a UN intervention force in the
Balkan dispute his plea demonstrated international
expectations of German involvement. 186 Yet, SPD chairman
Bjoern Engholm rejected pleas from within his own party to
accept military action directed toward the Balkans. 187 The
Wickert Institute straw poll of 1,788 Germans, conducted on
8 August 1992, resulted in a 77% rejection of military
intervention in Serbia by either NATO or UN-led forces,
clearly indicating a prevailing pacifist trend. 188
Even Mr. Kohl stated that after the German invasion of
Yugoslavia in World War II, no one should expect Germany to
send troops to the embattled Balkans. However, he did
express the opinion that the FRG should not restrict its
actions just to financial aid in the UN effort to quell the
violence. 189 Historical precedence notwithstanding, it was
186Ibid., 92-153, 7 August 1992, p. 6, "Kinkel Urges Role in
UN Missions," in LD0608113292 Hamburg DPA in German 0937 GMT
6 Aug 92.
187Ibid., 92-154, 10 August 1992, p. 7, "Engholm Rejects Role
by West," in AU0808133892 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Television
Network, 1100 GMT 8 Aug 92.
188 Ibid., "Citizens Oppose UN Action," in LD0808132692 Berlin
ADN in German 1253 GMT 8 Aug 92.
189Ibid., 92-158, 14 August 1992, p. 9, "Kohl Rules Out
Military Deployment to Yugoslavia, " in LD1308152492 Hamburg DPA
in German 1303 GMT 13 Aug 92.
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political suicide for Germany's leadership to pursue a
unpopular security burdensharing policy that could endanger
German soldiers ' lives under circumspect reasons and without
a solid consensus. Defense Minister Ruehe, commenting on
the Adriatic Sea mission, stated that, "we've developed a
culture of [military] reticence, and we must take many small
steps to overcome it." 190
Another step in showing Germany's willingness to assume
a greater international role took place in May 1992 when
Chancellor Kohl sent 150 German military doctors and medical
personnel to Cambodia to provide care to the deployed UN
forces participating in the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping mission. 191 The UN
peacekeeping mission's objectives were to implement a
political settlement of the Cambodian conflict through
supervising government functions and the eventual elections
in Cambodia in accordance with the Paris Agreement while
also rebuilding the country and disarming the warring
190Gail E. Schares, "The German Military Comes Out of the
Barracks," Business Week , 24 August 1992, no. 3280, p. 47.
191Volker Ruehe, "Change and New Departures in the Bundeswehr
Armed Forces of a United Germany," speech at the 33rd Commander's
Conference of the Federal Armed Forces in Leipzig, 14 May 1992,
p. 4.
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factions. 192 Germany's participation in the peacekeeping
mission was again solely of a humanitarian nature. However,
even though the death of Sgt. Alexander Arndt of the
Bundeswehr in Cambodia was the result of a random shooting,
70 other UN personnel died in Cambodia attesting to the
uncertainty of the humanitarian nature of Germany's
participation in the UNTAC mission. 193 In regard to
Sgt. Arndt ' s death, Defense Minister Ruehe commented, "We
are now going through the bitter experience that other
nations before us have had. " 194
The FRG was increasingly becoming militarily involved in
UN actions beyond the traditional boundaries of German
foreign and security policy. Regardless of the political
debate within Germany over a peacekeeping and combat role
for the Bundeswehr, the Kohl government continued to
formulate foreign policy by reinterpreting the
constitutional parameters of using the military for other
than defense of the Fatherland. The government's decision
to use the Bundeswehr for non-traditional missions in areas
not within the realm of the NATO guaranteed area pushed the
192Marjorie A, Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues
for Congress," (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress, 2 February 1992), p. 15.
193
"German Soldier Becomes the First Casualty of German
Involvement in UN Missions," p. 2.
194 Ibid.
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issue of peacekeeping and ultimately combat operations to
the forefront of foreign and security policy in the Post-
Cold War era. Chancellor Kohl's intent to establish a
precedent for German military involvement in a changing
security environment highlighted his intent to increase the
role that Germany was to play in the "new world order" and
also helped to establish a tradition of increased security
burdensharing among the regional and global alliance
frameworks. The desire to change German attitudes toward
greater participation in enforcing peace and security among
the global community became apparent through Mr. Kohl's
actions in not only the European region, but globally as
well. His next step was to attempt to legitimize his
foreign policy actions of military participation by changing
the German constitution to permit peacekeeping and combat
missions under the aegis of the UN and other regional
security alliances.
B. AN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION
In January 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali visited Germany and called upon the government to play
a "bigger role" in the United Nations by contributing to
military operations beyond the traditional scope of past
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German participation. 195 His hope of securing a German
commitment toward military participation in the evolving
UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia was fruitless based on
the unsettled debate over permitting Bundeswehr peacekeeping
missions. The CDU/CSU position maintained that peacekeeping
and peacemaking missions under the aegis of the UN were
possible without an amendment to the Basic Law. The senior
coalition partner argued that such actions were covered
under Article 24 in which "the state may join a system of
collective security to safeguard peace." 196 The CDU/CSU
interpretation of the constitution permitted Blue Helmet and
combat missions under the framework of collective security
organizations regardless of previously held views on the
physical limitations of German involvement.
The FDP, on the other hand, held the view that the
CDU/CSU interpretation was too far-reaching and maintained
that military missions, to include a combat role, first
required a change to the Basic Law to allow action under a
collective security organization like the UN, NATO, WEU or
the CSCE. 197 However, Foreign Minister Kinkel (FDP) agreed
195FBIS-WEU , 93-008, 13 January 1993, p. 12, "Calls for FRG
Contribution to UN, " in AU1201150293 Dusseldorf HANDELSBLATT in




with the CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman Karl Lamers who
advocated a change in the government restriction on military-
action which Lamers termed a "relic of history . " 198Mr . Kinkel
also concurred with Boutros Ghali's opinion that the
distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking missions
was no longer clear cut. Mr. Kinkel cited the Somalia
operation as a typical example of the "fraying" of Blue
Helmet missions. 199 After the UN Secretary General's visit,
Mr. Kinkel was confident that the coalition parties could
reach a consensus on a proposed amendment to allow
peacekeeping and combat participation in UN missions and
that the SPD could be persuaded to reach an agreement on the
proposed Basic Law amendment.
However, the SPD leadership reiterated its party's
position that only peacekeeping missions under the control
of the UN were possible after an amendment to restrict the
military to such operations was first established. The SPD
leadership argued that combat missions under the auspices of
the UN or any other collective security organization was out
of the question. The coalition parties held that the SPD
position amounted to a shirking of Germany's global security




block to redefining German foreign and security policy in
the changing political environment. The required two thirds
majority vote within Parliament on an amendment to change
the Basic Law allowing for UN peacekeeping and peacemaking
missions required the consensus of the SPD.
On 13 January 1993, Mr. Kinkel announced that the
CDU/CSU and the FDP agreed on a compromise draft amendment
which would permit the Bundeswehr to participate in
international peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the
UN and other regional collective security organizations. 200
Draft legislation amending Article 24 which called for
peacekeeping and peace-creating ( friedensschaf fende )
military missions was introduced into the Bundestag which
allowed German soldiers to participate in peacekeeping
missions "in accordance with a UN Security Council
resolution or within the framework of regional organizations
in the sense of the UN Charter." 201 Secondly, the proposal
allowed the Bundeswehr to take part in combat missions "when
and if the UN Security Council adopts a relevant resolution
on the use of enforcement measures." 202 In both cases,
200Craig R. Whitney. "Kohl and Partners Agree on German
Peacekeeping Proposal," New York Times , 14 January 1993, p. A4
201FBIS-WEU , 93-010, 15 January 1993, p. 15, "Coalition
Agrees on Participation, " in AU1501081093 Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jan 93, p. 1-2.
202 Ibid.
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approval by the absolute majority of the Bundestag would
first have to be achieved before Bundeswehr units could take
part in such missions.
Thirdly, the bill called for Bundeswehr participation
"in exercising the right to collective defense under UN
Charter Article 51
"
203 without first possessing a requisite
UN Security Council's relevant resolution. However, such
action could only be possible "along with other countries in
the framework of alliances and other regional organizations
of which the FRG was also a member." 204 The third clause was
intended to ensure the ability to participate in military
missions outside the alliance area along with other NATO or
WEU members. The participation of the Bundeswehr in
203UN Charter Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense [such as through NATO actions] if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security." (Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow Shares : The
Problems and Progress of International Organization , fourth
edition, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 476).
204FBIS-WEU , 93-010, 15 January 1993, "Coalition Agrees on
Participation," p. 15.
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missions under the third clause would first require approval
by a two thirds majority of the Bundestag. 205
However, on the first Bundestag vote, on
15 January 1993, the bill failed to amass the required two
thirds majority vote for passage. The SPD effectively
blocked the proposal from becoming a constitutional
amendment. 206 The SPD foreign policy spokesman Karsten Voigt
expressed the SPD rejection to the draft amendment on the
grounds that the third clause was unacceptable. He argued
that the FRG could conceivably fight in the Middle East or
Africa if a state requested military assistance from Germany
and a relevant UN Security Council resolution was not first
adopted. 207 The Western members of the Security Council
arguably could block the passage of a resolution which would
lead to the militarization of German security and foreign
policy which was counter to the SPD position of Germany
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The SPD maintained that Germany should not pursue
military objectives without the UN Security Council first
mandating such action regardless of the Bundestag's approval
by a two thirds majority vote in every case. Mr. Voigt used
the example that in the case of an attack on France (an
alliance member) , a two thirds majority vote would be
necessary to come to the defense of France if a UN
resolution was not be passed to mandate combat action,
whereas only a simple majority vote (under the second clause
of the draft amendment) would be required for German
soldiers to take part in combat operations in Kuwait (or any
other distant country) if a UN Security Council resolution
was already passed. 208 The SPD regarded such an amendment as
absurd and totally unacceptable. The coalition, in the
opinion of the SPD, was trying to redefine German security
and foreign policy toward an international military
interventionist line at the expense of traditional alliance
commitments
.
Furthermore, the Social Democrats countered by calling
on the coalition to adopt the SPD stance of amending the
Basic Law to allow commonly agreed upon peacekeeping and
humanitarian measures under the auspices of UN control
similar to the Cambodian- type mission. If the coalition
208Ibid.
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avoided such a move, then Germany would become isolated
through non-participation in humanitarian UN peacekeeping
missions. The other extreme of taking military action
without the consent of the SPD in the Bundestag would leave
the SPD with no choice but to consider such actions as
unconstitutional. Mr. Voigt argued that the CDU/CSU position
of not requiring a Basic Law change in the case of far
reaching foreign policy decisions would also require a
complete reversal of the FDP ' s traditional position of
requiring an amendment to allow the government to
participate in military actions. 209 Therefore, the SPD and
the FDP, according to Voigt, must then consider foreign
policy decisions involving the Bundeswehr in non-
humanitarian out-of-area missions as unconstitutional. The
SPD would then be forced to appeal the military action to
the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 210
In response to the SPD's claim that the coalition
government was haphazardly formulating foreign policy along
the lines of intervening militarily in both distant and
proximate regional conflicts without a sound legal basis and
without the consent of the minority party in the Bundestag,




desire to send the Bundeswehr to every crisis region in the
world was inaccurate. 211 He further stated that Germany was
never to act on its own, but only through its alliances and
in consonance with its security partners. Every individual
case was to be weighed against the background of German
values and national interests, in awareness of Germany's
historical responsibility, and only after an affirmative
parliamentary decision. He argued that the coalition's
actions to amend the Basic Law to permit a larger role for
the Bundeswehr through collective security organizations was
a responsible attempt at linking the lessons of history with
the security challenges of the future. 212
211Ibid., 93-011, 19 January 1993, p. 12, "Ruehe Endorses
Participation in UN Missions," in AU1501131993 Hamburg ARD
Television Network in German 0954 GMT 15 Jan 93.
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V. GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR GREATER UN PARTICIPATION
German attempts to establish the legal basis for extra-
territorial peacekeeping and combat missions was pre-mature
due to the inflexibility of the SPD party's position on
maintaining a pacifist foreign and security policy despite
the changes in the Post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, the
global and regional organizations played a larger role in
enforcing the collective security actions necessary to
resolve or contain violent unrest within the trouble spots
around the globe. The rise in tension in areas like Bosnia
and Somalia were indicators that increased action by the
collective security and defense organizations would be
required to maintain regional stability. Member states with
the requisite capability to contribute to military
enforcement of UN mandates was necessary to fulfill the goal
of stopping the bloodshed in these hot spots and containing
the spread of violence on a regional and global scale.
Germany's leaders were called upon by UN Secretary
General Boutros Ghali and the leadership of the FRG '
s
security partners to assume a greater role of military
participation the enforcement of peace and stability. The
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issue of German participation in military operations beyond
traditional limits was pushed to the forefront of national
politics by events in the Balkans and Somalia. The time had
come for Germany's leaders to make decisions concerning
German involvement in areas of unrest both regionally and
globally.
During 1993, the Balkan conflict, along with the
Somalian crisis, was at the forefront of German national
security and foreign policy. When the United Sates began
the symbolic air drops of aid to the besieged towns of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the German Luftwaffe also joined in the
humanitarian operation. Prior to the commencement of the
air drops on 28 March 1993, the Luftwaffe participated in
routine resupply flights to Sarajevo until the airport was
shelled and a Transall aircrewman was severely wounded by
ground fire directed at the airborne German aircraft. 213
German planes also flew 700 humanitarian aid missions to
Somalia from August 1992 through April 1993. 214 In addition,
German aircrew comprised one third of the NATO AWACS
213 Ibid., 93-060, 31 March 1993, p. 20, "Second Airdrop
Reported," in LD2903212393 Hamburg DPA in German 2050 GMT
29 Mar 93.
214Ibid., 92-062, 2 April 1993, p. 20, "Luftwaffe Completes
Somalia Relief Missions," in 93EN0308B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Mar 93, p. 7.
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reconnaissance flight contingent which was responsible for
"monitoring" the UN-mandated no fly zone over Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 215
A. BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE MILITARY ENFORCEMENT
On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council voted to
militarily enforce the no fly zone through the use of
fighter aircraft stationed in Italy and off the Adriatic
coast of Bosnia. UN Security Council resolution 816 became
effective seven days later 216 and NATO began enforcement of
the no fly zone on 12 April 1993. 217 The shift in the nature
of the mission from monitoring the compliance of the no fly
zone, directed primarily at the Serbs, to using combat
aircraft to militarily enforce the ban placed German
politicians in a position to further redefine the FRG '
s
national security policy. The mission of vectoring fighter
215
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Germany , (New York: German Information Center, 19 February 1993),
p. 1.
216
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217
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104
aircraft to intercept violators of the ban was now termed a
combat role. The UN resolution forced the Germans to either
pull the Luftwaffe crews out of the AWACS flights or the
German government could keep the German aircrews in the NATO
AWACS contingent ensuring that the mission could be carried
out successfully and Germany's loyalty to the NATO alliance
and the UN was not jeopardized.
Historically, German security and foreign policy goals
were in consonance with the policies of NATO. The attitude
expressed by the Kohl government was that any attempt by
Germany to abandon the NATO policies was a direct blow not
only to the North Atlantic Alliance, but also to Germany's
national identity of maintaining loyalty to the collective
defense organization that ensured the well being of the
German state throughout the Cold War. The idea of
abandoning NATO was out of the question to the ruling
coalition. According to the CDU viewpoint, Germany's
position within Europe and the world community would
deteriorate into one of isolation if the FRG chose to assume
a strategy of non-participation in NATO mandated military
missions
.
The CDU/CSU position on the AWACS no fly zone mission
was to maintain the integrity of the NATO AWACS flights by
keeping the Luftwaffe aircrews in place. The CDU maintained
that German participation in the UN mandated NATO AWACS
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operation was in compliance with the Basic Law which allows
for military participation within a collective security
system. 218 Furthermore, Chancellor Kohl clarified that
German aircrew were flying in aircraft that did not
inherently have an offensive capability other than acting as
a link in vectoring fighter aircraft to the vicinity of
violators of the no fly zone ban. The AWACS planes also did
not fly over the former Yugoslav country in the performance
of its mission and therefore did not constitute an out of
area mission. 219 CSU Deputy Hartmut Koschyk commented,
"Those who want the German military to leave the AWACS
planes want Germany to leave its European and international
responsibility and go into self-isolation." 220
The SPD position on the use of German military personnel
in the AWACS missions was clearly against using Germans in a
combat role. SPD Bundestag Group foreign policy spokesman
Karsten Voigt stressed that the SPD would apply for an
interim injunction from the Constitutional Court as soon as
218
"Ruehe Calls for German Participation in UN Military
Operations, 'Solidarity Pact' With Eastern Europe," p. 1.
219FBIS-WEU , 93-063, 5 April 1993, p. 23, "Kohl Views AWACS
Missions, Economic Problems," in AU0204192493 Mainz Satl
Television Network in German 1700 GMT 2 Apr 93.
220Ibid. , 93-064, 6 April 1993, p. 12, "Controversy Over
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WELT AM SONNTAG in German 4 Apr 93, p. 7.
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the government decided on continuing the AWACS missions. 221
SPD chairman Bjoern Engholm reiterated his party's position
that the SPD was prepared for new ideas in the political and
diplomatic field and would support Blue Helmet operations,
but only after an amendment was first passed. 222 He added
that the AWACS missions are "covered neither by the Basic
Law nor by a clearly defined NATO defense mandate." 223
The FDP, junior partner in the Kohl coalition,
maintained that the German aircrew would have to be pulled
out of the AWACS missions. Foreign Minister Kinkel stated
that if the AWACS planes were required to lead NATO fighter
aircraft to firing positions against Serbian aircraft then
his party would not support the CDU position unless an
amendment was passed to allow combat missions. Kinkel was
adamant that the government's decision to man the AWACS
flights would be unjustifiable without an amendment to the
Basic Law. "You won't get a violation of the constitution
221 Ibid., 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "SPD Criticizes
Compromise," in LD2503092993 Hamburg DPA in German 0008 GMT
25 Mar 93
.
222 Ibid., 93-061, 1 April 1993, p. 22, "Engholm Discusses
Political Goals, AWACS," in AU0104104593 Mainz ZDF Television
Network in German 2 015 GMT 31 Mar 93.
223 Ibid., 93-063, 5 April 1993, p. 27, "SPD's Engholm Attacks




with me, " he declared. 224 FDP chairman Otto Count Lambsdorff
indirectly threatened to break up the Bonn coalition if the
Kohl government decided to keep the Germans in the AWCAS
flights. He maintained that Bundeswehr soldiers would not
be covered by the Basic Law due to the combat status of the
missions . 225
In light of the irreconcilable differences between the
FDP and the CDU, the decision to support the NATO AWACS
flights with the requisite German aircrew was made by the
coalition with the understanding that the FDP would also
challenge the decision by appealing to the Federal
Constitutional Court to get a ruling on the validity of the
operation. 226 The FDP cited Article 26 in which "acts tending
to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful
relations between nations" as the basis not to go ahead with
the German contribution to the AWACS missions without
clarifying the Basic Law first. 227 Foreign Minister Kinkel '
s
224 Ibid., 93-012, 21 January 1993, p. 31, "Ruehe Says Pilots
to Retain AWACS Role Over Bosnia, " in LD2001094293 Hamburg DPA in
German 0855 GMT 20 Jan 93.
225Ibid., 93-015, 26 January 1993, p. 13, "FDP Warns of
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DPA in German 1214 GMT 25 Jan 93.
226Ibid., 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "CDU Announces
Compromise Reached, " in LD2403224693 Berlin DDP in German
2048 GMT 24 Mar 93.
227Alan Riding, "NATO Members Agree to Enforce UN Ban on
Flights Over Bosnia," New York Times , 3 April 1993, p. 5.
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opinion was that a split in the coalition at that point in
time would have been senseless. He defended the coalition's
decision to let the Constitutional Court decide the issue
due to the impasse not only between the CDU and the FDP, but
also because of the SPD's entrenched position. 228 Mr. Kinkel
commented that, "We [the government] have the dilemma of
believing that while we should be able to do it, we can't,
and are arguing about whether we can't go ahead anyway." 229
In an Emnid Survey for PER SPIEGEL , conducted from
22-24 March 1993, 1,000 Germans were asked, "Should German
soldiers participate in the implementation of the ban on
flying over Bosnia imposed by the United Nations?" of which
53% responded favorably and 42% were against, while 5% gave
no opinion. 230 In another question, the survey asked, "Should
Bundsewehr aircraft participate in the air lift to support
the Muslims encircled in east Bosnia?" of which 86% answered
228FBIS-WEU , 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "Kinkel Defends
Coalition's Agreement," in LD2503114293 Berlin ADN in German
1108 GMT 25 Mar 93
.
229
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Times , 8 April 1993, p. A6
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230FBIS-WEU , 93-064, 6 April 1993, p. 17, "Government Cedes
AWACS Issue to Court Review," in 93EN0338A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in
German No. 13, 29 Mar 93, p. 18-23. 59% of the CDU/CSU
respondents were for the German participation and 54% of the SPD
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affirmatively and 10% were against, while 4% had no
opinion. 231
Foreign Minister Kinkel softened his party's stance on
the issue by stating that the AWACS flights cannot be
equated with a direct combat mission. 232 He also regretted
that the government had no recourse but to allow the
Constitutional Court to clarify the legal position on a
possible German involvement in the AWACS operations. 233 He
primarily blamed the situation on the SPD's reluctance to
compromise on an amendment to the Basic Law. He reiterated
that the Bundeswehr must "be in a position to take part in
peacekeeping blue helmet missions and in exceptional
circumstances in peacemaking measures." 234
On 8 April 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled
5 to 3 not to invoke a temporary halting injunction and that
German military personnel could participate in the AWACS
missions. 235 The Court, however, did not rule on the
231Ibid. 89% of the CDU/CSU respondents were for the airlift
and 88% of the SPD respondents were for the airlift also.
232 Ibid., 93-065, 7 April 1993, p. 11, "Kinkel Says Bosnia
AWACS Flights Not Combat Missions," in LD0704075593 Berlin ADN in
German 2314 GMT 6 Apr 93.
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fundamental issue of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions
in out of area instances. The legislative and executive
branches were to decide upon the foreign and security policy
issue of the Bundeswehr ' s role in the changing international
environment. If another impasse were to occur on foreign
and security policy in regard to the constitutionality of
the issue, then the Court could be called upon again to make
a ruling.
The argument put forth both by the CDU/CSU and FDP
parties that the withdrawal of the 162 German aircrew would
seriously impair the success of the AWACS missions and also
cause severe political damage to Germany and the NATO
alliance in resolving the Balkan crisis affected the Court's
decision. 236 The decision to take no action in the UN-
mandated and NATO-led AWACS missions would cause a severe
rupture in the NATO alliance that would be devastating not
only to Germany's well being, but also to the western
European states as a whole. The enduring stability of the
region, maintained through the existence of NATO, would be
jeopardized due to the German decision not to militarily
participate in the NATO AWACS missions. The CDU/CSU argued
that Germany's abstention on the vitally important NATO
236FBIS-WEU , 93-067, 9 April 1993, p. 16, "Constitutional
Court Hears Arguments in AWACS Case," in AU0804131693
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8-9 Apr 93.
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mission would create a worse situation for Germany's stature
and well being within the European region than if the
aircrew were allowed to assume the combat support role
within the confines of the NATO guaranteed area. 237
The Federal Constitutional Court agreed to allow the
German military participation of its aircrews specifically
on the basis of the CDU/CSU's argument. The Court felt that
Germany would suffer enormous and irreparable foreign policy
damage if the German military did not participate in the
NATO AWACS missions. 238 If the Court had ruled the other way
and not allowed the German participation, then Germany would
have been forced to embark on a special path of isolationist
policy in dealing with regional crises at the periphery of
its borders. However, the Court ruling was based solely on
the political reality of increased domestic and foreign
pressure for the FRG to assume a greater role in
international military operations affecting crises in the
Post-Cold War era. 239
237Chancellor Kohl maintained that the NATO AWACS flights did
not cross into former Yugoslavian airspace and therefore was not
violating the traditional Constitutional interpretation of
defending Germany and the NATO alliance area.
238 Ibid., 93-069, 13 April 1993, p. 13, "Kinkel Discusses
Bosnia No Fly Zone Operation, " in AU1304102093 Cologne
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239Marc Fisher, "New Debate Erupts on German Military,
"
The Washington Post , 16 April 1993, p. A21.
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The FRG passed through another crossroads in the
formulation of foreign policy and a greater German
contribution toward the burdensharing responsibility of
European security and stability. 240 CSU national Chairman
Theo Waigel remarked that the Court made a "decision of
great political and legal importance that pointed the way
into the future." 241 However, Guenter Verhuegen of the SPD
Bundestag parliamentary group voiced the opposite opinion
that the decision was temporary and only pertained to the
Bosnia conflict. He warned the government coalition not to
interpret the decision as "carte blanche for Armed Forces
operations of all kinds." 242 The SPD attempted to pass
legislation in the Bundestag calling for the withdrawal of
the German aircrew from the AWACS missions on 21 April 1993
The attempt failed by a vote of 343 to 199 (with nine
abstentions) at stopping the German involvement despite the
Court decision to allow the mission. 243 In another vote on
240FBIS-WEU , 93-069, 13 April 1993, p. 16, "Further
Commentary, " in AU1104191193 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
10 Apr 93, p. 6.
241
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German 1654 GMT 21 Apr 93.
113
the same day, the Bundestag approved the government decision
by a margin of 341 to 206 (with eight abstentions) 244 to
support German participation in the evolving UN humanitarian
aid operation in "peaceful areas" of Somalia. 245
The issue of German military involvement in out-of-area
missions reached another qualitative level through the Kohl
government's decision to actively participate in the UN
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. German involvement on a
global scale, in consonance with the FRG ' s alliance
partners, showed that the German contribution to increased
security burdensharing did not stop at the limits of the
NATO Alliance area or of the European region. Germany's
ruling coalition felt that Germany must also be responsible
for the stability of regions further in distance than the
Balkans. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition maintained that
Germany's responsibility for enforcing stability in areas
not directly affecting Germany's security was necessary now
that Germany was a fully sovereign state and on a level with
the other democratic member states of the United Nations.
244
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Approves Decision to Provide Aid to Somalia, " in LD2104173693
Berlin ADN in German 1642 GMT 21 Apr 93.
114
The Kohl government argued that it was in Germany's best
interests to contribute military units to UN efforts if the
FRG was to maintain a foreign and security policy that
benefitted regional and global aims of safeguarding human
rights and the promotion of democracy abroad.
B. SOMALIA MISSION
On 17 December 1992, Chancellor Kohl announced his
intention to increase the number of Luftwaffe humanitarian
flights to Somalia. In anticipation of UN Secretary General
Boutros Ghali's visit to Germany, Chancellor Kohl also
pledged a battalion of the Bundeswehr to the follow-on
UN mission at the conclusion of the U.S. -led Operation
Restore Hope. The objective of the battalion was to assist
in the nation building process in passive areas of Somalia.
The German unit was to consist of engineers, medical
personnel, telecommunications specialists, military police
and security forces strictly for self-defense of the unit. 246
Defense Minister Volker Ruehe detailed the composition of
the German "humanitarian intervention" contribution to the
UN mission (UNOSOM II) as an equivalent Regiment of 1,500
246,, Germany to Send Military Personnel to Somalia; Increase
Number of Aid Flights Now, " The Week in Germany , (New York:
German Information Center, 18 December 1992), p. 1
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personnel of which 150 were infantry soldiers. 247 Mr. Kohl,
aware of the ambivalent SPD position on deploying troops
outside of traditional limitations, expressly stated that




In January 1993 foreign policy spokesman for the SPD
parliamentary group Karsten Voigt commented that his party
was vehemently against the military deployment without a
prior amendment to the Basic Law. However, he also
reaffirmed that the SPD supported all that the UN and the
Secretary General expected of Germany in conjunction with
the Somalia mission, but that any German participation must
be preceded by an amendment to allow peacekeeping troops to
be deployed. 249 After Defense Minister Ruehe announced on 15
April 1993 that German troops were to deploy to Somalia in
June 1993, the SPD protested that the mission was too
dangerous at that time and reiterated that the Bundeswehr
247FBIS-WEU , 93-006, 11 January 1993, p. 11, "Bundeswehr
Completes Planning for Somalia Deployment," in AU1101102893
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should take part in humanitarian operations only if the
chance of becoming involved in combat is non-existent. 250
In response, Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that the
government's conditions for deploying the Bundeswehr
consisted of assurance from the UN Secretary General that
German units would be stationed in pacified regions of
Somalia with a low probability of combat engagements, that
the German contribution was purely humanitarian in nature,
and that the use of weapons was only for self-defense. 251
After the Constitutional Court ruling on the use of
German forces in the NATO AWACS planes for the Bosnia no fly
zone missions, Chancellor Kohl commented that,
"
[The Somalia
deployment of German troops] is an important decision for
Germany's international solidarity. .
.
[because] our
international partners expect us to participate in
Somalia." 252 Foreign Minister Kinkel laid out the objectives
of the German contingent in Somalia to help rebuild the
nation by clearing mines off the roads, providing
transportation assets for the UN force, distributing aid and
250Marc Fisher, "New Debate Erupts on German Military,
"
The Washington Post , 16 April 1993, p. A21.
251FBIS-WEU , 93-074, 20 April 1993, p. 19, "Kinkel Urges
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New York Times , 21 April 1993, p. A4
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relief supplies, building shelters for the refugees and
establishing the water system again. 253 After the government
clarified the humanitarian role that German troops were to
play in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the popular
support for this type of operation increased. This trend
was evident in the Allensbach Institute's poll which showed
that 50% of the German respondents supported the FRG '
s
ability to send troops to UN missions, while 31% were
opposed and 19% had no opinion. 254
On 21 April 1993, the Bundestag voted 341 to 206 to
support the government decision to send the Bundeswehr to
Somalia to fill a humanitarian role. 255 Unlike the German
military involvement in the Bosnia no fly zone issue, the
FDP was in agreement with the CDU/CSU position on a
humanitarian troop deployment to Somalia. Foreign Minister
Kinkel released a policy statement prior to the vote in
which he stated that the FRG, like the rest of the UN
members, must assume three tasks of conflict prevention,
peacekeeping and creating conditions of peace. Kinkel also
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constitutional consensus about the mission of the Bundeswehr
that enables [the FRG] to work under the umbrella of the UN
and alongside [Germany's] partners toward fulfillment of the
three tasks. 256
The SPD Chairman Bjoern Engholm argued that the Somalia
mission was a "classic blue helmet mission" and that a
constitutional precondition was missing for the proper
execution of German military involvement. He warned the
Kohl government that if German troops were deployed to
Somalia, then his party would be forced to appeal the
decision to the Constitutional Court. 257 Engholm denied that
a split occurred within the SPD concerning the admissibility
of German troop involvement in both peacekeeping and combat
operations if the proper conditions first existed. Earlier,
Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD parliamentary floor leader, said his
party was not opposed to sending military units to certain
parts of Somalia under the banner of the UN, but that an
amendment was required and the SPD was prepared to achieve a
change to the Basic Law. 258
256
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However, internal division within the SPD was evident on
the issue of troop deployments for other than UN
peacekeeping missions without a Basic Law change if the
proper political and security conditions were in place for
establishing an operation. This attitude could be a
reflection of the ZDF Political Barometer poll taken in
April in which 50% of the west Germans responded that in the
future the Bundeswehr should be able to participate in
combat missions. However, only 38% of the east Germans
polled answered favorably to a future combat role. 259 The
lower percentage of the east German respondents could be
attributed to the general pacifist and apathetic attitude
prevalent within former East Germany as a result of the
oppressive militaristic government system that dominated all
aspects of society during the Cold War.
An advance unit of 45 Bundeswehr troops deployed to
Somalia in the second week of May 1993, followed shortly by
an additional 100 soldiers to establish a base of operations
in Belet Huen. 260 Belet Huen is situated in a relatively
calm area 186 miles from Mogadishu, the internal hot bed and
259FBIS-WEU , 93-080, 28 April 1993, p. 27, "Poll Shows
Increase in Government Popularity, " in AU2604083393 Munich
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24-25 Apr 93, p. 12.
260
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Capitol of Somalia. 261 The remainder of the 1,640 strong
German military unit deployed in June and July 1993 and was
composed of two infantry companies (for self-defense), two
engineer companies, two logistics companies, a military
police detachment, and signals, medical and maintenance
companies . 262
In June 1993, after several armed clashes between rival
clans and UN peacekeepers in Mogadishu caused the deaths of
23 Pakistani UN peacekeepers, the SPD petitioned the Federal
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to temporarily halt the
deployment of German troops already in progress at that time
and to clarify the constitutional basis for the military
deployment. 263 According to the SPD, the parameters of the
mission changed from a humanitarian operation to a combat
role with the stationing of 50 Bundeswehr personnel in
Mogadishu acting as a German liaison to the UN Command
headquartered in the Capitol. After the fighting erupted in
Mogadishu, the 50 military technicians and specialists were
261
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flown out to Nairobi, Kenya. 264 The SPD was concerned that
German troops would be drawn into combat and therefore not
covered under the constitution without a clarification to
allow German soldiers to participate in such operations. 265
On 23 June 1993, the Court handed down a decision
allowing the German military deployment in Somalia to
continue. 266 The Somalia ruling signified a defeat for the
SPD in clarifying the Basic Law toward the position favored
by the Social Democrats . As in the case of the Bosnia no
fly zone issue, the Court ruled specifically on the Somalia
deployment and not on the broader issue of the
constitutionality of out-of-area peacekeeping and combat
missions. In their ruling, the judges emphasized the
Bundestag's responsibility in deciding the issue of
deploying troops to Somalia and elsewhere through the
passage of formal resolutions. Both parliamentary Chairmen
of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, Wolfgang Schaeuble and Werner
Hoyer respectively, expressed relief at the Court's decision
and stated the ruling greatly contributed to securing the
FRG ' s ability to act in foreign and security policy issues
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beyond the borders of Germany and NATO. The Court also
hinted that a decision on the general issue concerning the
Basic Law and the role of the Bundeswehr in foreign and
security policy could be expected in 1994. 267
The situation in Somalia worsened on 15 July 1993, when
nine German soldiers were shot at by Somali fighters at the
Mogadishu airport. 268 However, none of the men were wounded
and they did not return fire. In another incident in
Mogadishu, German soldiers were unharmed at the UN Command
headquarters after an exchange of fire by Somali clansmen
and UN peacekeepers. The German base at Belet Huen was also
fired on by rival clans with no casualties on either side. 269
Amid the growing concern that German troops might become
involved in the fighting, the SPD continued to call for the
withdrawal of German forces from Somalia due to the
resurgence of violence within the country. Foreign Minister
Kinkel countered the SPD assertions by stating:
[although the situation] gave cause for concern .. .The use
of German troops in Somalia is not without danger and
everyone knew that, including the Federal Constitutional
Court and the Bunsdestag. .
.
[ the fighting] cannot cause us
267 Ibid.
268
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to withdraw our soldiers, as the only country among thirty
[participating in UNOSOM II] . 270
The deaths of 17 U.S. Rangers and the wounding of 75 more in
heavy fighting during October 1993 caused a shift in U.S.
foreign and security policy within Somalia that called for
the pull out of U.S. military forces by 31 March 1994. As a
result of the U.S. decision, the German government along
with several other troop contributing European countries,
announced the withdrawal of their military forces in
conjunction with the planned U.S. pull out. Yet, from the
beginning of discussion on a possible military involvement
in Somalia, the German government maintained that the
initial deployment of Bundeswehr personnel was to terminate
after six month period anyway.
Germany's leadership argued that the military
participation in Somalia was significant and important in
promoting democracy and stability in Somalia. The German
military involvement in the Bosnia no fly zone enforcement
operation, aid and resupply airlifts to Bosnia, humanitarian
airdrops and the Adriatic Sea mission also contributed to
thwarting Serbian aggression and safeguarding Bosnian lives.
The military medical unit deployed to Cambodia also
highlighted Germany's burdensharing contribution toward
270Ibid.
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establishing peace and security not only in regional crises,
but global conflicts as well. The significance of
Sgt . Alexander Arndt ' s death in the Cambodian deployment
showed that humanitarian missions, just like peacekeeping
operations, are inherently dangerous and can sometimes blur
into combat situations. The political debate within Germany
over a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr involved not
only compromise and consensus, but also a re-interpretation
of old views on the legality and extent of using the
military as a tool of foreign policy in a changing security
environment
.
The decisions by the Kohl government to take military
action, in the UN-mandated multi-lateral operations,
indicated a trend in German foreign and security policy to
assume a greater role in helping to influence world events.
The goal of assuming military humanitarian missions led to
the idea of future participation in peacekeeping missions.
Inherently, armed peacekeeping missions can lead to the
possibility that these types of operations could lead to
combat. Yet, the objective of peacekeeping missions is not
to become involved in combat for the purpose of defeating an
opposing side, but is aimed toward the promotion of regional
and global stability and peace. The issue of adopting a
foreign and security policy that maintains the ability to
use military force for peacekeeping missions also means that
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the potential use of armed force in combat is an inherent
part of this type of a military role.
German reticence on utilizing its military as a tool of
foreign policy in the changing Post-Cold War security
environment was based on past unilateral historical actions
which resulted in far reaching repercussions to Germany's
well being and the world. The SPD maintained that the
German military should not be used for purposes other than
peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN, yet the feeling
within German society, as reflected through the actions of
the Kohl government and the Federal Constitutional Court,
was that military involvement in peacekeeping missions was
in the best interests of Germany and the global community.
The resolution of the peacekeeping debate is not complete.
However, the impetus is present to assume a greater role in
world affairs should Germany's leadership deem that German
participation in military actions under the banner of
collective defense and security organizations is necessary
to safeguard stability and peace within the European region
or on a global scale.
The decisions by the Kohl government concerning military
participation in the Balkans, Cambodia, and Somalia are
small steps toward assuming full fledged peacekeeping
missions for the Bundeswehr which will unavoidably lead to
the eventual role of participation in combat operations.
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This action does not mean that Germany will repeat history
by unilaterally marching off to the sound of distant
thunder, but shows that the FRG is in the process of
assuming the role that other mature, stable democratic
states have already maintained in resolving acts of
aggression against other members of the global community.
The German debate over military peacekeeping missions for
the Bundeswehr is the first step toward an eventual combat
role with the intention to use military force as a means of
stopping aggression by belligerent states and promoting the
ideals of stability and security in the Post-Cold War era.
The use of German military force, not only for the
defense of the Homeland, but for positive measures of
ensuring the protection of human rights abroad and the
promotion of democracy in areas under the threat of
authoritarian rule is the act of a mature and responsible
nation. The positive resolution of the German debate
surrounding a peacekeeping mission will lead to an increase
in the security burden-sharing responsibility and the
enhancement of relations among the more developed
democracies of the world.
However, the political parties still differ on their
interpretation of the constitution and the issue of
peacekeeping missions for the Bundeswehr. Until the parties
can come to an agreement on the role of the Bundeswehr in a
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changing security environment, the government will not be
able to utilize the military in foreign policy decisions
that could involve potential peacekeeping or combat
missions. Therefore, the position of the military, the
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government and the SPD opposition
party on the divisive issue are important to understanding
the political gridlock prevalent within the German polity.
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VI. THE POLITICAL DILEMMA OF COMPROMISE
The debate over a peacekeeping mission for the
Bundeswehr primarily involves the political parties that
possess the ability to influence the government's foreign
and security policy decisions. In addition, the military's
viewpoint is important because the role of the Armed Forces
is at the crux of the issue. However, unlike the pre-Cold
War days, the military's position in the German state is not
one of supremacy to the government ' s leadership or the
political parties. The Bundeswehr was established under the
precept of the soldier as a citizen first and the primacy of
civilian control of the military. The founding father of
the Bundeswehr, Wolfgang Graf Baudissin, best summed up the
position of military in society and government as the
"citizen in uniform." 271 Although the Bundeswehr ' s top
leadership possessed a distinct view on the role the
military should play in the Post-Cold War era, the Minister
of Defense stated the official position of the military on
the peacekeeping issue. The General Inspector, the head of
271Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told
Tale, " p. 88.
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the joint Armed Forces staff, is subordinate to the Defense
Minister as a department head. 272 Nevertheless, the
recommendations of the Bundeswehr joint staff were important
for understanding the attitude of the uniformed leadership
in participating in potential peacekeeping and combat
operations. The General Inspector is designated as the
principal military advisor to the Defense Minister and to
the federal government. The General Inspector is a non-
voting member of the Cabinet's Federal Security Council and
can be called on by the Security Council or the Chancellor
to answer questions or provide expert or advisory opinion on
matters pertaining to the military. 273 The General Inspector
maintains the role of primacy in overall Bundeswehr
planning. He is responsible for the "harmonizing and
coordinating of service views on how to meet the economic,
demographic, and social constraints that will shape the
Bundsewehr in the 1990' s." 274 Therefore, the General
Inspector must prepare the Bundeswehr to assume peacekeeping
and combat operations if the government leaders decide on
such missions
.
272 Ibid., p. 92.
273 Ibid., p. 96.
274 Ibid., p. 97.
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A. MILITARY VIEWPOINT
In February 1992, the Bundeswehr joint staff submitted a
report entitled "Military Policy and Military Strategic
Principles and Conceptual Basic Tendencies of the
Restructuring of the Bundeswehr" which outlined a framework
for the military structure to follow through the 1990' s.
This report was the first official report by the Bundeswehr
on a new defense policy Germany's reunification. The report
stated that the Bundeswehr must begin preparation for NATO
"out of area" deployments based on an Alliance and European
assessment of the risks from a worldwide perspective. 275 The
report fueled the debate within Parliament on whether the
military should assume missions other than the defense of
the homeland. Both the SPD and the FDP labeled the report
as irresponsible planning on the part of the Bundeswehr and
the Defense Ministry. FDP Deputy Juergen Koppelin remarked
that the report "intended to create an international police
force." 276 Both Parties accused Defense Minister
Stoltenberg, by allowing the report to be published, of
275FBIS-WEU , 92-027, 10 February 1992, p. 17, "Secret
Doctrine Denied, " in LD0702115792 Hamburg DPA in German 1643 GMT
6 Feb 92 and "TAZ Says Defense Ministry Plans New Doctrine, " in
LD0702114692 Berlin ADN in German 1557 GMT 6 Feb 92.
276Ibid., 92-030, 13 February 1992, p. 29, "SPD, FDP Reject
Stoltenberg's Bundeswehr Plans," in AU1302121892 Munich
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Feb 92, p. 2.
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ignoring the military tenets of the Basic Law. 277 He was
reminded of the primacy of civilian political control to be
maintained over the Bundeswehr.
In February 1992, German Defense Minister Gerhard
Stoltenberg remarked that the Bundeswehr must adapt to the
changing geopolitical situation of international crisis
management by abandoning the position of considering itself
as just a "front line state." 278 He proposed that the
Bundeswehr assume three primary missions: as part of an all-
European balance of military potentials; in defense of
German and Allied borders; for collective operations outside
the NATO area, and through participation in international
peacekeeping missions. 279 He reiterated that the broadest
political consensus would first be required to assume the
function of "preserving peace and defending international
law" yet, he felt that the Bundeswehr should "take part in
the entire range of international missions within the
framework of the UN Charter." 280
277 Ibid.
278Ibid., 92-022, 3 February 1992, p. 19-20, "Stoltenberg on
New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy, " in 92GE0202A Fankfurt/Main
SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German no. 1, Jan 92, p. 9-12.
279Ibid., 20.
280Ibid., 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 8, "Stoltenberg Remarks
on Bundeswehr Missions," in AU1601134392 Cologne Deutschlandfunk
Network in German 1200 GMT 16 Jan 92.
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In consonance with the new NATO strategy concept of
establishing crisis reaction forces as the first line of
defense and main defense forces as the second line,
Mr. Stoltenberg planned to attain these goals for future
Bundeswehr participation through the establishment of NATO-
oriented German "crisis reaction forces" and also through
the maintenance of German main defense forces. 281 His actions
toward effective and rapid crisis management and, if
necessary, the establishment of combat-ready units
underscored the importance of the debate on future roles for
the Bundeswehr. 282 Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur (Chief of
Staff) Klaus Naumann ' s intentions were to organize the Armed
Forces toward the role that German troops were playing in
the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia (not from a
humanitarian perspective, but from one of protection). 283 He,
like Stoltenberg, understood that a political clarification
by the parties on the peacekeeping role would have to be
enacted prior to complete preparation for such missions.
281Ibid., 92-003, 6 January 1992, p. 14, "Bundeswehr To Get
Crisis Deployment Capability, " in LD0501102492 Berlin ADN in
German 0637 GMT 5 Jan 92.
282 Ibid., 92-009, 14 January 1992, p. 12, "Stoltenberg Lays
Out New Plans for Bundeswehr, " in AU13 01144592 Hamburg WELT AM
SONNTAG in German 12 Jan 92, pp. 1, 2.
283 Ibid.
, p. 15, 16, "Naumann Intends to Reorganize
Bundeswehr, " in AU0501191592 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in
German 1000 GMT 5 Jan 92.
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Still, the military was beginning to plan for contingencies
in anticipation of a government decision to allow for
peacekeeping and possibly combat operations.
In March 1992, Gen. Naumann remarked that one of his
tasks was to prepare German soldiers for participation in
international peacekeeping missions once the appropriate
constitutional requirements were in place. In reality, he
perceived that the necessary political consensus for such
missions would be a long term process. Nevertheless, he was
progressing with plans to outfit a battalion of 1,000 to
2,000 men for a German contribution to an international
peacekeeping mission. 284
After he assumed the position of Minister of Defense,
Volker Ruehe commented on 15 January 1993 to the Bundestag:
Germany is facing the task of assuming equal
responsibility as its neighbors in a new, changed
international system. War as a political instrument
has returned to Europe. Why should a 19-year old
Polish soldier in 1993 shoulder greater responsibility
for peace and security in Europe than a 19-year old
German soldier? The motto cannot be; All for one, but




284 Ibid., 92-063, 1 April 1992, p. 13-15, "Inspector General
Views Bundeswehr Goals," in AU3103200092 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in
German 27 Mar 92, pp 7-8.
285Ibid., 93-011, 19 January 1993, p. 12, "Ruehe Endorses
Participation in UN Missions," in AU1501131993 Hamburg ARD
Television Network in German 0954 GMT 15 Jan 93.
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Within the military itself, Gen. Naumann ' s aims for
possible peacekeeping missions did not represent the
majority viewpoint. In May 1992, an opinion poll conducted
by the Bundeswehr psychological service showed that only
42 percent of the military polled would take part in UN Blue
Helmet operations. In addition, the poll showed that only
about 15 percent advocated UN mandated "armed missions." 286 A
study by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr
in Munich carried out in the spring of 1992, showed that the
officer corps held mixed opinions on the potential for the
Bundeswehr ' s deployment outside of Germany for either
peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. 287
General Naumann asserted that what he needed from
members of the military was an awareness that the
"overwhelming majority of [the] people supported
participation in UN missions ... all of which are
dangerous." 288 He further commented that Germany needed
"Armed Forces that will have to carry out a great number of
286 Ibid., 92-104, 29 May 1992, p. 20, "Soldiers Oppose
Deployment Outside Germany, " in AU2505175492 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL
in German 2 5 May 92, p. 16.
287Ibid., 92-106, 2 June 1992, p. 14-15, "Bundeswehr Officers
Seek Clear Goals, Mission," in 92GE0358A Hamburg DEUTSCHE
ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German No 17, 24 Apr 92, p 11.
288Ibid. , 93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 9, "Bundeswehr ' s Naumann
on FRG Role in UN Missions," in AU0703210093 Cologne
Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1005 GMT 7 Mar 93.
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tasks in the future. .. ranging from humanitarian missions to
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations." 289 General Naumann
saw no strict demarcations between all these missions. He
commented that a "chemically clear-cut distinction between
humanitarian and armed operations under the auspices of the
UN is as impossible as a clearly defined dividing line
between UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions." 290 He
reiterated that the Bundeswehr must be capable of mounting
not only humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, but
peacemaking operations as well. 291 General Naumann was
planning for the availability of a complete division for
peacekeeping missions by 2000. 292 General Naumann was
concerned about what he termed growing doubts of
trustworthiness and reliability by Germany's security
partners in the FRG ' s willingness to share the risks.
He asserted that Germany must not assume a special role of
reticence and isolation which also affects the mood among
the soldiers. 293
289 Ibid., p. 10
290Ibid., 93-045, 10 March 1993, p. 28, "Naumann Warns
Against Refusing Role in UN Peacekeeping, " in LD0903185293
Hamburg DPA in German 1636 GMT 9 Mar 93.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid., 93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 9, "Bundeswehr ' s Naumann
on FRG Role in UN Missions," p. 11.
293 Ibid., p. 12.
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However, General Naumann ' s comments were criticized by
members of all the political parties. Walter Kolbow, SPD
Bundestag Group defense policy spokesman, said that what
matters is the "acceptance of the primacy of politics" and
that Gen. Naumann ' s comments reached their "limit." 294
Werner Hoyer, FDP security policy spokesman, said Gen.
Naumann was walking a "hot tightrope." 295 CDU deputy and
defense expert Otto Hauser noted that even if Gen. Naumann
was correct in his statements, that it was "none of his
business to tell the politicians what he was thinking and to
discredit them." 296 Gen. Naumann later stated that he
welcomed a political decision to the question of the future
role of the Bundeswehr and he hoped that the broadest
possible consensus could be reached. 297
Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Helge Hansen, in
June 1992, stated that, although German soldiers were still
"nursing their wounds" over the government's decision not to
get involved in a combat role during the Gulf War, the
294Ibid., 93-046, 11 March 1993, p. 22, "Political Parties
Criticize Bundeswehr ' s Naumann," in AU0903230293 Munich
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Mar 93, p. 2.
295Ibid.
296Ibid.
297 Ibid., 93-062, 2 April 1993, p. 23, "Bundeswehr Chief
Naumann on Collective Security Role," in 93EN0279A Berlin
DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 13 Mar 93, p. 5.
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Bundeswehr would be ready to participate in UN peacekeeping
missions starting in 1993 . He also asserted that a
constitutional clarification should first be enacted in
order for the Bundeswehr to able to fulfill this type of
military mission. 298 In the spring of 1992, LtGen. Hansen's
staff began contingency planning for a "brigade-strength
Army unit" to shift from a peacekeeping mission to a
peacemaking (using force) role "following a deterioration of
the situation in a crisis area." 295 LtGen. Hansen remarked,
"We cannot afford to sit out another round [in reference to
the Bundeswehr ' s non-combat role in the Persian Gulf
War]." 300 In an advisory to the Army in August 1992, LtGen.
Hansen spelled out preparations for German soldiers to take
part in operations "inside and outside the NATO
area. .. [with] special attention in training ...devoted to
combat, as well as to registering and transporting the
dead." 301 However, LtGen. Hansen was severely admonished by
members of the political parties for overstepping the bounds
298Craig R. Whitney, "Cold War Past, Germans Ask Why Army Is
Still Necessary," New York Times , 23 June 1992, p. A8
.
299FBIS-WEU , 92-148, 31 July 92, p. 7, "Background to
Bundeswehr' s Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg
DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 2 Jul 92, p 22-29.
300Ibid.
301Marc Fisher, "U.N. Urges German Military Role,
"
The Washington Post , 12 January 1993, p. A14
.
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of his position. He was accused of assuming the role of the
government in deciding on missions for the Bundeswehr.
Even Gen. Naumann criticized the "wishy-washy"
politicians' lack of assertiveness in reaching a political
consensus on peacekeeping missions, "If you want world
peace, you must get involved, not just express your
concern." 302 However, Gen. Naumann proposed the deployment of
Bundeswehr troops only if "the majority of the population is
in favor of it." 303 He reiterated that the future role of
the military was to prevent conflicts and guard the peace.
Yet, he could not effectively accomplish this peacekeeping
goal unless such a mission was in consonance with the Basic
Law. 304
Defense Minister Ruehe concurred with the uniformed
leadership that the FRG needed the broadest agreement of
society for a new role of the Armed Forces in a changing
world. 305 However, the political reality of the situation was
that the majority of the public did not necessarily agree
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid., 92-208, 27 October 1992, p. 23, "Klaus Naumann
Views Future Bundeswehr Functions," in 93E0021C Bonn
DAS PARLAMENT in German No 41, 2 Oct 92, p. 15.
304 Ibid.
305Ibid., 93-079, 27 April 1993, p. 16, "Poll Shows 53%
Against Bundeswehr Missions Abroad, " in AU23 04145093 Hamburg
DIE WOCHE in German 23 Apr 93, p. 1.
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with the military leadership's viewpoint. In a poll
conducted by the Dortmund FORSA Institute for DIE WOCHE in
April 1993, 53% of the respondents expressed that the
military should stick to the exclusively defensive task. 306
Only 21% approved of German peacekeeping missions under UN
command and just 12% supported combat missions of German
soldiers outside of the NATO guaranteed area. 307
Nevertheless, upon receiving direction from Defense
Minister Ruehe, Gen. Naumann began preparation of two
battalions to be capable of taking part in UN peacekeeping
operations by the end of 1993. 308 The size of the force being
readied for peacekeeping missions is minuscule in comparison
to the total German Armed Forces, yet the idea of preparing
any units at all for such a mission is a large step toward
changing firmly entrenched linear defense attitudes not only
in the military but also within the political parties and
the German general population. However, the military
preparations are not an indicator that political consensus
is forth coming in the near future. The coalition
government still must obtain a two thirds majority vote to
amend the constitution to permit the military to assume
306Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308John G. Roos . "General Klaus Naumann," Armed Forces
Journal International , February 1993, p. 45.
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peacekeeping or peacemaking missions under the control of
the UN or other regional security organizations. The view
of the CDU/CSU party to reinterpret the existing articles of
the constitution is not enough to formulate foreign and
security policy. The FDP and the SPD require further
clarification. The military viewpoint is important, but in
the long run it is not a driving factor in the CDU/CSU 's
attempt to alter traditional military missions toward
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The Coalition
government must agree to a common policy and then attempt to
persuade the opposition to adopt the same viewpoint on
peacekeeping missions.
B. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION
(CDU/CSU) VIEWPOINT
The moderate Christian party, the Christian Democratic
Union, allied with the Bavarian Christian Social Union
party, emerged after World War II and has played a major
role in German politics throughout the Cold War and the
present. Although both parties maintain independent
structures, they form a common caucus in the Bundestag and
do not run opposing party-platform campaigns (although they
threaten to from time to time) . Primarily composed of
Catholics and Protestants, the allied CDU/CSU also
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encompasses all economic classes. The CDU/CSU is generally-
conservative, especially on economic and social policies,
and is closer identified with the Roman Catholic and
Protestant churches than the other major parties.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl has served as the party chairman for
the CDU since 1973. The CSU is chaired by Theo Waigel, who
succeeded Franz Josef Strauss upon his death in 1988. 309
The CDU/CSU is the senior coalition party in control of the
government. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government, headed by
Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) , took control in 1982 and
replaced the SPD-FDP coalition chaired by the SPD's
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
Defense Minister Stoltenberg, a member of the CDU Party,
in January 1992, advocated that the Bundeswehr should assume
UN collective military missions outside the NATO area. He
adamantly stated that the Bundeswehr must be able to
participate "in the full spectrum of international
missions," which includes peacekeeping operations. 310
CDU Deputy Bernd Wilz, CDU/CSU defense policy spokesman, was
more specific in outlining the future tasks the Bundeswehr
should assume. Speaking for the CDU/CSU Party, he stated
309U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Background Notes: Germany , p. 5-6.
310FBIS-WEU , 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 9, "Supports UN
Mission Participation, " in LD1601102492 Hamburg DPA in German
0832 GMT 16 Jan 92.
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that the four missions should be: defense of the FRG;
contributing to NATO with a new strategy of multi-national
integration; contributing to collective security
organizations (UN, WEU, etc.) after the Basic Law had been
amended; and humanitarian missions. With regard to the
proposed Bundeswehr third task, Wilz declared, "that would
begin with [Bundeswehr participation in] the UN peacekeeping
forces but would also include active military missions when
and if hotbeds of tension have to be pacified." 311
In March 1992, after the SPD threatened to propose a
constitutional amendment restricting Bundeswehr operations
strictly to UN peacekeeping missions, Karl Lamers , CDU/CSU
foreign policy spokesman, remarked that assuming
peacekeeping missions was a necessary move toward the FRG '
s
normalization as a country which upholds international law.
Yet, he further stated that a constitutional restriction on
limiting the scope of military missions to only peacekeeping
operations was not advocated by the CDU/CSU. 312 Instead, the
CDU/CSU supported the role of both peacekeeping and
311Ibid., 92-018, 28 January 1992, p. 7, "Parties
Increasingly Attacking Stoltenberg, " in AU2801104292 Hamburg
BILD AM SONNTAG in German 26 Jan 92, p 2.
312 Ibid., 92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 15, "CDU/CSU Rejects
Narrow Bundeswehr Role," in AU2403164792 Frankfurt /Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 92, p 6.
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peacemaking operations for the Bundeswehr
.
313 He further
claimed that an amendment to the Basic Law was not necessary
for the Bundeswehr to participate in UN Blue Helmet
missions. According to Lamers, membership in the UN
constituted tacit approval to abide by the UN Charter under
which participation in peacekeeping missions was an
obligation. Article 25 of the Basic Law spelled out that
international law out-ranks German law and that an amendment
to allow UN peacekeeping missions therefore was not
needed. 314
When Volker Ruehe (CDU) took over as Defense Minister in
March 1992, he also stated that peacekeeping operations
would be the first step in fulfilling international
obligations as spelled out in the UN Charter. 315 Mr. Ruehe
recognized that a political consensus for establishing not
only peacekeeping but peace-enforcing roles would be hard to
achieve. The issue of out-of-area deployments and the use
of the Bundeswehr for missions other than self-defense was
313 Ibid., 92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 7, "Politicians Discuss
Future of Bundeswehr, " in AU0604201392 Mainz 3SAT Television
Network in German 1730 GMT 2 Apr 92.
314 Ibid., 92-071, 13 April 1992, p. 21, "CDU's Lamers Cited
on Army's UN Action Role," in 92GE0281B Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 92, p 6.
315Ibid., 92-076, 20 April 1992, p. 6, "Ruehe Cited on
Bundeswehr NATO Participation, " in AU 2004085092 Hamburg DIE WELT
in German 18 Apr 92, p 5.
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still an uneasy concept for the general population to
accept. In June 1992, Mr. Ruehe favored an aggressively-
manifested security policy of Bundeswehr peacekeeping
deployments in which "everything else will come
afterwards." 316 He intended to create the necessary
prerequisites for UN peacekeeping missions by the end of
1992. 317 His attempts were not realized by his self-imposed
deadline. A clear consensus was still not possible in light
of the changes in the international security environment in
the transition to the Post-Cold War era.
The CDU/CSU has consistently maintained that a Basic Law
amendment is unnecessary for UN peacekeeping missions. Yet,
in light of the SPD opposition to participation in
international military combat operations and owing to the
lack of social consensus on using the military for roles
other than territorial defense, the CDU/CSU Party has
offered proposals to the SPD on amending the Basic Law for
immediate Blue Helmet operations and combat operations in
316Ibid., 92-114, 12 June 1992, p. 12, "Parties View UN
Missions, Eurocorps," in AU1106141192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jun 92, p. 1-2.
317 Ibid.
,
p. 11, "Defense Minister Warns Against German




principle. 318 A proposal submitted to the SPD leadership by-
Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Hornhues, in
June 1992, called for a simple majority vote within the
Bundestag for peacekeeping missions and a "qualified
majority" to include approval by the Chancellor would be
required in the Bundestag for combat operations. 319 The SPD
outrightly refused to agree to such an amendment.
CSU Chairman Theo Waigel, in June 1992, commented that
German Armed Forces should also participate in combat
operations. He felt that the main foreign policy tasks
should include preservation of German interests both
"bilaterally, within the European framework, and at the
international level." 320 CDU/CSU Bundestag Caucus Chairman
Schaeuble stated in July 1992 that combat missions were
compatible with the Basic Law for reasons mentioned
previously, yet the Party was prepared to clarify the
318Ibid., 92-121, 23 June 1992, p. 21-22, "Ruehe Seeks
Compromise With SPD on UN Missions," in LD2006093292 Berlin ADN
in German 0848 GMT 20 Jun 92.
319Ibid., 92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 11-12, "CDU, SPD Submit
Plans for Bundeswehr Actions," in AU1806141592 Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jun 92, p. 5.
320Ibid., 92-128, 2 July 1992, p. 7, "Waigel Urges German
Role in UN Combat Missions," in AU3006082592 Hamburg
WELT AM SONNTAG in German 28 Jun 92, p. 1, 6.
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issue with a Basic Law amendment to end the debate. 321
Finding a compromise amendment suitable in wording and
content, which is agreeable to all the political party-
views, became the stumbling block toward passage of a
constitutional change allowing either peacekeeping or combat
missions. The consensus of the coalition swing-member FDP
Party, in agreeing to the CDU/CSU version of an amendment,
became increasingly more important for a required two thirds
majority passage.
The CDU/CSU party cited Article 24 of the Basic Law in
which the senior coalition partner justified Bundeswehr
missions within the framework of the UN and other regional
defense organization like NATO and the WEU. The need to
clarify the constitution through an amendment was not
necessary based on a re-interpretation of the traditional
government stance as laid out in the previously mentioned
1982 German Federal Security Council Resolution. However,
in the interests of establishing a solid political consensus
the CDU/CSU party was willing to agree on amending the
constitution toward peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.
The CSU was more assertive than the CDU in stating that
the Basic Law need not be changed. Wolfgang Boetsch,
321Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 9, "SPD Policy on Combat
Missions," in AU2107072892 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
in German 2 Jul 92, p. 1-2.
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Chairman of the CSU land Group in Wildbad Kreuth, stated
that "Germany's ability to act in foreign policy must be
comparable to that of France and Great Britain." 322 He
stressed that an amendment that restricted the FRG to
peacekeeping measures only was "fatal" and "handcuffed"
German foreign policy. 323 Mr. Boetsch asserted that the
government should not "go into the Babylonian captivity of
the SPD in every case." 324
Chancellor Kohl stated the government's position that
without reservation the "complete participation in
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-implementing measures"
under the command of the UN was required by Germany. 325 As a
member of the UN, Mr. Kohl stressed that the FRG has a
responsibility to fulfill the duties of a UN member and that
"anything else would be incompatible with the dignity of
Germany.
"
326 He stated that Germany must fulfill its
international responsibilities in individual cases by
322 Ibid., 93-008, 13 January 1993, p. 15, "CSU Favors
Participation in Combat Missions in FRY, " in AU1201171593 Munich
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11 Jan 93, p. 2.
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developing certain criteria to facilitate the legal and
moral basis for such actions. "A special road for Germany
in the implementation of security interests would lead to
political isolation, " he commented that would lead Germany
astray from the comfort and security of its alliances. 327
If Chancellor Kohl expects to formulate a forward looking
foreign policy incorporating military involvement in UN
peacekeeping operations, then his party must agree on an
amendment to the Basic Law that satisfies the requests of
the FDP, junior partner in the coalition, as well as the
Social Democrats. However, based on the inflexibility of
the party positions the likelihood of passing an amendment
in the near future which satisfies all of the parties'
concerns seems remote. A common consensus between the
CDU/CSU and FDP coalition members on an amendment was a slow
process that required compromise within both parties.
C. FREE DEMOCRAT PARTY (FDP) VIEWPOINT
The FDP traditionally has been made up of middle and
upper class Protestants who regard themselves as





328 The FDP has participated in all but three of
the post World War II governments. In the 44 year history
of the FRG, the FDP has been in coalition with the ruling
majority party (ies) for 41 years. Elected in 1988, FDP
Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorf
f
329 was succeeded by Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel on 11 June 1993. 33 °
In March 1992, the FDP advocated three distinct missions
for the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO guaranteed area. The
first possibility was UN peacekeeping measures. The next
option consisted of the use of military force as mandated by
the UN Security Council (such as the Gulf War scenario) . The
last mission concerned peacekeeping measures under the
auspice of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) acting in accordance with Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter as a "regional organization." 331 The possibility
of passing an amendment to allow German soldiers to become
international peacekeepers would only be supported by the
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FDP if such missions were first based on a UN resolution. 332
FDP Chairman Lambsdorff modified his Party's stance on a
constitutional amendment that stipulated a mandate solely
from the UN for military action by the Bundeswehr. He
included the Western European Union (WEU) , as a subordinate
organization to the UN Security Council, which could also
mandate the use of force in order for the Bundeswehr to
respond. 333
Unlike the CDU/CSU, the FDP linked the use of Bundeswehr
forces for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions
exclusively to a prerequisite UN Security Council resolution
or a regional collective security organization (as spelled
out in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) mandate. 334 Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP), in August 1992, commented that
an agreement had been reached within the government
coalition that military operations beyond the scope of only
Blue Helmet missions should be carried out. He reiterated
the FDP stance that any military action, whether
332 Ibid., p. 14, "Genscher on FRG Soldiers in Non-UN
Missions," in AU2403143492 Frankfurt /Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
in German 23 Mar 92, p. 6.
333 Ibid., 92-102, 27 May 1992, p. 19, "Lambsdorff Favors UN,
WEU Force Deployment," in 92GE0340B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Apr 92, p. 4.
334 Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 10, "FDP Presidium Backs
Adriatic Role," in AU2107083192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Jul 92, p. 1-2.
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peacekeeping or combat, must first be under the aegis of the
UN and also approved by the Bundestag. 335
In August 1992, then FDP Chairman Lambsdorff commented
that the FDP Presidium favored an amendment to the Basic Law
covering peacekeeping operations by the German military
which could "in an emergency" take part in combat oriented
missions as well. 336 The FDP maintained its position of
favoring combat missions under a proposed Basic Law change,
provided that the UN framework would be utilized for
Bundeswehr troop participation. 337 FDP Chairman and Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel reiterated the party position that an
amendment was desirable that allowed Blue Helmet operations
and ultimately combat missions also. 338 He stressed that his
party will only agree to military missions under the
335Ibid., 92-155, 11 August 1992, p. 11-12, "Kinkel Supports
Protection for Bosnian Aid Efforts," in AU1008104492 Cologne
Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0515 GMT 10 Aug 92.
336Ibid., 92-157, 13 August 1992, p. 4, "Lambsdorff Favors
Amendment on UN Troop Missions," in LD1008185792 Berlin DDP in
German 1205 GMT 10 Aug 92.
33701iver Thranert, "Germans Battle Over Blue Helmets,"
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 48, no. 8, Oct. 1992,
p. 35.
338FBIS-WEU , 93-006, 11 January 1993, p. 5, "Kinkel
Interviewed Prior to Talks," in AU1101103593 Hamburg ARD
Television Network in German 2100 GMT 10 Jan 93.
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auspices of UN control or regional organizations mandated by
a UN resolution. 339 Mr. Kinkel commented:
...that no people can take leave of their past and their
history. We [Germans] in particular must keep in mind
that terrible things happened. But somehow we must also
liberate ourselves and become normal to be able to assume
additional responsibilities as a result of German
unity. 340
Mr. Kinkel advocated a more active German role in the world
and said "checkbook diplomacy (in reference to German
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf War) was a thing of the
past." 341 Through compromise, the FDP and the CDU/CSU
coalition agreed upon an amendment change which incorporated
the FDP position of military action under the banner of the
United Nations. Yet, even though the FDP gave its full
support to an agreed upon amendment, the coalition
government still did not have a two thirds majority
necessary for passage. The Loyal Opposition SPD outrightly
opposed to combat missions and peacekeeping operations not
under the control of the UN.
339 Ibid., p. 7, "Kinkel Supports FRG Role Only in UN Military
Operations," in LD0801180293 Berlin DDP in German 1641 GMT
8 Jan 93
.
340Ibid., 93-019, 1 February 1993, p. 14, "Kinkel Views AWACS
Missions, Other Issues," in AU2801150493 Halle MITTELDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG in German 25 Jan 93, p. 4 (Tentative).
341Ibid., 93-042, 5 March 1993, p. 28, "Kinkel Urges
Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Missions, " in AU0403143993
Frankfurt /Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Mar 93, p. 2.
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D. LOYAL OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY (SPD) VIEWPOINT
The SPD, the other major party in Germany, is one of the
oldest political organizations in the world. Founded in
1863, the SPD traditionally advocated Marxist principles. 342
However, in 1959, the party adopted the "Godesberg Program"
and abandoned the concept of a class party. 343 The SPD still
continues to support social welfare programs.
Originally, the SPD opposed the FRG ' s entry into NATO.
However, in September 1960, the party formally approved of
Germany's membership in the NATO Alliance. The party
currently continues to stress Germany's ties to the
Alliance. However, in the past, the SPD fought against
specific NATO programs in favor of SPD proposals under the
auspices of "security partnership" with the East. 344 The
SPD's base of support originates from the larger cities and
the industrialized states. Elected in May 1991, Bjoern
Engholm stepped down as SPD chairman in May 1993 amid a
scandal and was succeeded by Rudolf Scharping. 345
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In January 1992, the SPD outlined its position on Blue
Helmet operations by demanding that only unarmed Bundeswehr
units should participate in UN peacekeeping missions. 346 The
SPD agreed in principle to use the Bundeswehr as a "guardian
of peace" but, not through the use of force in safeguarding
that peace. 347 However, this pacifist position was not
unanimously agreed upon by all SPD deputies. In April 1992,
SPD Deputy Norbert Gansel commented that the Bundeswehr
should first be used in Blue Helmet operations under the UN
framework. He went on to say that if legal prerequisites
between the UN and its member states were established to
allow UN forces to act as a "global policeman in
reestablishing and safeguarding peace, " then the German
Armed Forces should also take part in this peace-
enforcement . 348
The SPD proposed to eliminate the "grey area of
constitutional law" concerning the use of the Bundeswehr by
recommending an amendment that would permit peacekeeping
346FBIS-WEU , 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 9, "Supports UN
Mission Participation, " in LD1601102492 Hamburg DPA in German
0832 GMT 16 Jan 92.
347 Ibid., 92-032, 18 February 1992, p. 15, "Commentary
Criticizes New Bundeswehr Plans," in AU1602182492 Frankfurt/Main
FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Feb 92, p. 3.
348Ibid., 92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 8, "Politicians Discuss
Future of Bundeswehr," in AU0604201392 Mainz 3SAT Television
Network in German 1730 GMT 2 Apr 92.
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missions under the framework of the UN. In June 1992, SPD
Bundestag Group Chairman Klose announced the SPD intention
to amend the Basic Law in such a way that peacekeeping
missions would be allowed but combat missions would be ruled
out. 349 Yet, following the government's actions in
dispatching Bundeswehr units to "monitor" the UN embargo of
Serbia and Montenegro in July 1992, the SPD position began
to soften toward the possibility of a future UN-led
Bundeswehr combat role. 350 SPD Chairman Engholm remarked,
"when the UN has a clear and worldwide monopoly to use force
and then asks [the FRG] to participate in certain [combat]
missions, but only under the auspices of the UN," then the
SPD would have to rethink its current position on the use of
military force. 351
In August 1992, Deputy Chairwoman Hera Daeubler-Gmelin
reiterated the SPD position of proposing a clarifying
amendment to permit Blue Helmet but, not combat operations.
She further explained that the SPD would not agree to
349 Ibid., 92-114, 12 June 1992, p. 12, "Parties View UN
Missions, Eurocorps," in AU1106141192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jun 92, p. 1-2.
350Ibid., 92-135, 14 July 1992, p. 19, "SPD Threatens Suit
Over Bundeswehr Missions," in AU1107175592 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG in German 11-12 Jul 92, p. 1.
351Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 9, "SPD Policy on Combat
Missions," in AU2107072892 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
in German 2 Jul 92, p. 1-2.
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missions similar to the Allied combat role in the Gulf
War. 352 Yet, former Minister Egon Bahr (SPD) advocated
participation by German soldiers in UN operations, which
restore "peace by force" as "possible and useful." 353
The war in the Balkans compelled Mr. Klose to change his
peacekeeping-only view. Although he did not advocate a
German combat role in the former Yugoslavia, he remarked
that, "the Bremen resolution of no combat involvement makes
the [SPD] look ridiculous." 354
The SPD viewpoint on the viability of Blue Helmet
missions versus combat missions gradually underwent a
transformation in which participation of the Bundeswehr in a
UN commanded combat role is conceivable for the Social
Democrats also. 355 In November 1992, at a special convention,
the SPD agreed to back the government ' s bid to remove
constitutional barriers to Bundeswehr deployment outside of
352Ibid., 92-158, 14 August 1992, p. 9-10, "SPD Official
Opposes UN Combat Missions Role," in AU1308123792 Berlin
BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 10 Aug 92, p. 5.
353 Ibid., 92-162, 20 August 1992, p. 9, "Bahr Favors Combat
Missions Under UN Command, " in 92GE0469C Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG in German 25 Jul 92, p. 6.
354 Ibid., 92-187, 25 September 1992, p. 26, "SPD Rift Over
Bundeswehr Deployment Analyzed, " in 92GE0507A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in
German no. 38, 11 Sep 92, p. 4.
355Ibid., 92-192, 2 October 1992, p. 13, "Article Analyzes
Future Foreign Policy Goals," in 92GE0528A Hamburg DEUTSCHES
ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German no. 35, 28 Aug 92, p. 4.
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the NATO guaranteed area. 356 The debate over whether such
deployments should solely be peacekeeping and not peace-
enforcing was not settled at the SPD convention. The SPD
majority still favored only UN Blue Helmet operations.
When the coalition proposed a Basic Law amendment in
January 1993, the SPD position had not changed to allow for
combat operations, even under the control of the UN or under
the aegis of a UN resolution. SPD party leader Bjoern
Engholm commented, after the amendment failed, that the SPD
position of advocating UN Blue Helmet operations "covered
95% of all possible deployments within the framework of the
United Nations." 357 He explained the SPD's criticism and
rejection of the Basic Law amendment as too restrictive from
the opposite end of the spectrum since peacekeeping
operations under UN command practically encompassed all
possible types of involvement that the SPD advocated in a
constitutional amendment.
Even after Rudolf Scharping assumed the SPD party
leadership position, the SPD did not alter its position
regarding participation by the Bundeswehr in only UN
controlled peacekeeping missions. At the SPD party
356
"Worldwide," Wall Street Journal , 18 Nov. 1992, p. Al
357FBIS-WEU , 93-009, 14 January 1993, p. 23, "Engholm Rejects
Proposed Amendment on Bundeswehr ' s Role," in LD1301185493 Hamburg
DPA in German 1715 GMT 13 Jan 93.
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convention on 16 November 1993, the Social Democrats
outlined and approved the party platform of committing
military soldiers strictly to peacekeeping missions under
the aegis of the UN and only after parliamentary approval of
such participation. 358 The SPD reiterated its continued
opposition to Bundeswehr participation in UN military
actions that were not of a humanitarian or traditionally
peacekeeping nature. 359
With state and Federal elections taking place throughout
1994, the likelihood of the peacekeeping debate becoming a
hot campaign issue is not probable. The domestic concerns
of a flagging economy and rising unemployment brought on by
the unification process will no doubt highlight the
political election races. In addition, the major parties
are predicted to lose part of their hold in national
politics to the minor far right and left wing parties. The
possibility of a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the
SPD is a possibility if the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition fails to
win a solid majority again. What this means to the issue of
a changed security policy to permit peacekeeping missions,
358
"Social Democrats Convene Party Convention: 'We Can and
Will Govern'," The Week in Germany , (New York: German Information
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let alone combat operations, is that the debate will not be
addressed in the election year. Unless a cataclysmic event
occurs in the future which requires the German government to
immediate resolve the divisive issue, the debate likely will
not be settled in the foreseeable future. The political
parties are presently more concerned with domestic political




In June 1992, the WEU members (Germany being one of the
nine member states) agreed to form a military force that
could be sent on peacekeeping missions. These missions,
according to WEU ministers, were only to be carried out
after requests from the UN Security Council or the CSCE.
The German contribution to the military force consisted of
dual-hatted NATO troops and the newly formed Franco-German
Corps. 360 Also in June 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali recommended to the UN Security Council that Article 43
of the UN Charter be modified to make troops available on a
permanent and ad hoc basis to deter world-wide aggression.
He requested on-call "peace enforcement units" to serve in
situations in which the mission capability of peacekeeping
troops was surpassed. 361 Mr. Boutros-Ghali expressed that the
360Steve Vogel. "West European Force to Be Formed,"
Washington Post , 20 June 1992, p. A18.
361Lucia Mouat. "UN Overhaul Is Seen as Key to Expanded
Peacekeeping Role," Christian Science Monitor , 22 June 1992,
p. 3.
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time had come for "preventive deployments" of the peace-
enforcement mission. 362
The German public did not necessarily agree with Mr.
Boutros-Ghali ' s sentiment on the need to establish peace-
enforcement units. In an October 1992 poll, 65 percent of
the German public supported German participation in UN
peacekeeping operations. However, the poll also showed that
53 percent of the western Germans and 59 percent of the
eastern Germans opposed a combat role for the Bundeswehr
.
363
The poll indicated that the public perhaps was ready to
accept a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr but was not
psychologically ready for a combat role.
Defense Minister Volker Ruehe concurred that the general
populace was not mentally prepared for a potential
Bundeswehr combat role. In addition, he explained that the
military also was not yet logistically or psychologically
ready to assume combat operations, even if an amendment were
362
"Peacekeeping; Round Up a Posse." The Economist , vol. 323,
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to be passed to allow such missions. 364 He planned to change
these shortcomings so the Bundeswehr would be able to
fulfill the missions in the event the UN called upon Germany
to participate in either peacekeeping or peace-enforcing
operations and the political parties agreed to permit these
types of roles. 365 He aptly stated:
Where peace and law are violated, where conflicts are
pursued by force, and important German interests are
endangered, we must also be willing, at the request of the
international community, to make a contribution to
preserving peace. In the constitution we need an opening
for peace-establishing measures on the basis of the
stipulations of the UN Charter. Whoever pushes Germany
into a special role in this connection will make it
incapable of political action... in the long run. Our
soldiers must fight for global peace if the United Nations
calls upon us to do so. 366
However, Mr. Ruehe recognized the political gridlock on
permitting such missions and knew that the Bundeswehr '
s
deployment in UN combat missions was still "very far
away. n36 ' The political reality of the present dictates that
a change in the constitution is not likely. The parties are
364FBIS-WEU , 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 6, "Ruehe Views
Adriatic Blockade, " in AU2107064392 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
20 Jul 92, p. 32-35.
365Ibid, p. 7-8.
366Ibid., 92-176, 10 September 1992, p. 16, "Ruehe Notes New
Security Policy, " in AU0909164092 Mainz ZDF Television Network in
German 1241 GMT 9 Sep 92.
367 Ibid., 92-219, 12 November 1992, p. 18, "Ruehe Views
Future Role of Bundeswehr, " in LD1011235692 Hamburg DPA in German
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163
not willing to compromise on the issue of allowing
peacekeeping missions, let alone peacemaking or peace-
enforcing missions in which the probability of combat is
present, under the banner of the United Nations. The issue
has been relegated to the back burner of the daily political
agenda in favor of the more pressing domestic issues of
unification, economic revival and the upcoming state and
Federal elections
.
The shape of German defense policy at the close of 1993,
more than three years after unification and two years after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, reveals a contradictory
picture. The makers of German defense policy have moved
away from the familiar world that they obtained from the
establishment of the FRG and fostered through the Cold War
until unification in 1990. Germany's leadership has moved
toward a more active international role for security policy
beyond the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the Cold War
that was dominated by a policy of reticence. However, the
path forward is not entirely clear. Strategic interactions
of the elements that constitute the making of German defense
policy at the time of this writing are not completely
suggestive that the Federal Republic of Germany can easily
assume the burdens of a world power that some analysts
confidently hinted at three years ago, or even some were
bold enough to suggest in different circumstances in the
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1970s. While the Kohl cabinet and the military look forward
to a more far reaching security policy and seek to secure
the means to achieve this goal, the other political elements
in the making of strategy, especially at home and the nature
of the threats abroad confound the Kohl government '
s
movement away from the old familiar German strategic world.
This well known set of strategic practices also brought
success for the FRG in a way that preceding ideals of force
and statecraft had never been able to do. In the last
twenty years of the long Cold War struggle, this familiar
strategic security outlook was visible for all the world to
see in the pages of the Ministry of Defense White Papers,
complete with the multi-colored pictures of the so-called
layer cake defense on the inner-German border. The
certainty that year after year during the Cold War, NATO
forces would remain arrayed in place reflected the
durability of the Federal Republic of Germany's success in
alliance defense in the Atlantic coalition.
This German defense policy reflected the outgrowth of
NATO's policy of dual containment in which the defense
against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by the alliance
of the Western European states and the North Atlantic
democracies was guaranteed. At the same time, the FRG
joined the ranks of the Western powers by means of strategic
mechanisms that assured the FRG ' s neighbors of a guarantee
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against the revival of German outward expansion. The
creation of this policy of dual containment also brought
forth a corollary of what one might call dual integration.
The Bundeswehr was integrated in turn into a multi-national
defense alliance in which the makers of policy found a means
to subordinate German power while assuring the defense of
the FRG on a multi-national basis. Meanwhile, the
instruments of democratic control in the nascent FRG (as
interpreted through the Basic Law and later in the MOD White
Papers) assured that the soldiers would remain loyal to the
government and the Western alliance. All of this succeeded
with results that no one could have easily predicted at the
time that these instruments were first put in place.
The strategic revolution of unification, the collapse of
Communism and the Soviet Union, and all that followed in the
Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Somalia and beyond, has cast all
of the above into a cockeyed perspective. The familiar has
long vanished. Repeated attempts in the Defense Ministry to
offer the German public a new White Paper on the state of
affairs in regard to an up-to-date, coherent defense policy
have failed since the "roller coaster" of strategic events
has not come to a rest.
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A. DEBATE CONTINUES
While Germany has done anything other than leap out of
the strategic confines of the past epoch, the makers of
policy have found great difficulties in adjusting their
labor to the present. This state of affairs should come as
no surprise. The creation of these structures forty years
ago took a long time to evolve into their current form even
in the face of what today seems a clear Stalinist threat in
the wake of the Second World war and the resultant bi-polar
division of the world. Today, however, the perils of
intellectual exhaustion, economic straits, rising chaos as a
result of imperial decline and the contention between the
industrialized powers forms the backdrop of German foreign
and security policy on the world scene. It is a place where
the Germans have seldom felt at home and a place where the
policy of reticence of a state situated in the middle
between the big powers was a familiar role in which all
European countries might feel comfortable and safe.
This feeling of comfort and safety is now gone. The
collective security and defense institutions that flourished
in this Cold War world flounder in today's world of change.
This state of affairs is liable to continue so long as the
present parameters remain in effect. That is, so long as
the major powers fail to agree on the shape of new security
arrangements for dealing with future crises. While the
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international system of responsible states fails or only
very modestly succeeds in the face of present threats, they
face further trials. The issues of who should have a
monopoly on the use of force, individual sovereign states or
supra-national organizations, remains unclear and thus
adversely affects the outcome of the question over the use
of military force. This generalization applies especially
to the Germans with all of their laudable progress on
developing a new security policy in a changed international
environment notwithstanding.
The debate on peacekeeping missions continues within the
German parliament. With the threat of the Balkan War
spilling over into neighboring states and the residual
effect of this regional instability directly affecting
Germany's national interests, the debate will become more
intense. The resolution of the peacekeeping debate will
more than likely establish the means for a Bundeswehr
deployment in a supra-national peacekeeping framework. Once
this action occurs, the next step toward a combat oriented
role would seem to be much easier to accomplish.
If German soldiers are fired upon in a peacekeeping
mission, the obvious response would be to fire back in self-
defense. The fine line between peacekeeping and peace-
enforcing would be crossed and combat will have taken place.
The responsible politicians are aware that this scenario can
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and does happen quite frequently in peacekeeping operations.
The next logical step in legitimately backing up the
military when it is confronted with hostile fire would be to
sanction a combat role.
Defense Minister Ruehe has said that Germans must get
used to the idea that Bundeswehr troops will be deployed
beyond the FRG ' s borders in the future. International law,
in the form of UN, CSCE, WEU and NATO resolutions calling
for military action, will dictate that Germany's response
should be a contribution to peacekeeping and peace-enforcing
missions. Mr. Ruehe commented that a collective "change in
mentality" is needed to meet the internationally changed
situation. 368 German leaders will eventually have to work out
a political solution. This author firmly believes that a
political resolution will eventually allow for Bundeswehr
participation in offensive military actions. Yet, the
political reality of the current situation does not warrant
immediate action by the elements of the government.
Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr will have two battalions ear-
marked in the spring of 1993 369 and ready by the end of the
368FBIS-WEU , 92-197, 9 October 1992, p. 9, "Ruehe Calls For
Consensus on Security Policy, " in LD0810195792 Hamburg DPA in
German 1849 GMT 8 Oct 92.
369 Ibid., 92-189, 29 September 1992, p. 14, "Defense Minister
Interviewed on Current Events," in AU2609150392 Hamburg BILD in
German 2 5 Sep 92, p. 2.
169
year for future peacekeeping missions. 370 Like any other
professional military force, in the event of a political
decision, the Bundeswehr is somewhat surreptitiously
planning for combat contingency operations.
The debate on peacekeeping missions has come to its
first vote with less than optimal results. In the
potentially unstable post-Cold War era, another crisis may
precipitate further military action on Germany's part. The
general consensus has shifted toward taking a more decisive
approach in deterring aggression through peacekeeping
measures. The ongoing debate is proof of the call for such
measures and the future implications signify a trend toward
eventually greater involvement.
Yet, makers of U.S. policy should keep the following in
mind. In only a few weeks, Germany faces a series of
elections that will last until the Fall of 1994 that may
result in a change of government. The upshot of this
marathon of elections may be a grand coalition government or
a minority government. In any case, these elections may
curtail the reach of German foreign policy. The Kohl
government already struggles with the faltering pace of
European unification and consolidation that began to be felt
370Ibid., 92-183, 21 September 1992, p. 26, "Ruehe Outlines
New Plans for Bundeswehr, " in LD1709163592 Hamburg DPA in German
1401 GMT 17 Sep 92.
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in 1991-1992. The demands of domestic consolidation
continue without pause and have been more difficult than
originally thought to be.
A forward strategic policy requires the support of the
electorate. Yet, the domestic ills of a newly sovereign
country does not bode well in the near term for resolving
the issue of the use of military force in German statecraft.
The German electorate is in no mood for German world policy
on the model of 1897 or 1908. The Social Democratic Party,
which in the past brought forth such experts in defense
policy as Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt remains deeply
divided about the present realities of force and statecraft,
as it has since the collapse of the old defense consensus in
Germany in the late 1970s. This electoral constellation is
further darkened by the on-going social crisis of
unification and the structural problems of the European
economies in comparison with the American and Asian centers
of industry. All of this poses an enormous dilemma for the
Social Market economy and the makers of German foreign
policy. The makers of German defense policy must adjust
their efforts to these realities.
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B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR A COMBAT ROLE
History has shown that peacekeeping actions tend to turn
into peace-enforcing measures which invariably involve
combat. Most normal states understand this relationship. If
the need arises to engage in combat, these countries enact
the necessary legal and constitutional provisions to
legitimately support this type of military action. Germany
should not act differently in the long run provided a
complete transformation in national security policy thinking
happens within the country. The peacekeeping debate, if
successfully concluded to allow the use of military force
for other than defense purposes, will eventually lead to an
expanded combat role for Germany's Armed Forces.
As previously noted, the Bundeswehr remains deeply
integrated within the Atlantic security institutions.
Germany does not possess the capability to operate military
forces unilaterally for any extended length of time outside
the immediate boundaries of the Republic. The requisite
assets and are not present within the Bundeswehr ' s inventory
and the money to finance such programs is not forthcoming.
Germany's Armed Forces are suffering the same fate as the
U.S. military due to the end of the Cold War and the draw
down in size and budget. Furthermore, the psychological
makeup of the typical German soldier in a conscript military
does not currently allow for a far reaching defense policy.
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As of this writing, one of the more noteworthy German
strategic forays of late, the NATO opening to the east
championed by Volker Ruehe at a meeting of the NATO Defense
Ministers in October 1993 at Travemuende , Germany brought an
angry response from a sinister quarter. The head of Russian
foreign intelligence Primakow, protested against the
expansion of NATO to include the former member of the Warsaw
Pact. No doubt, the German assert iveness here on inclusion
into the West security camp must burn in the old wounds of
those who have silently watched the ignominious withdrawal
of Soviet power from its western ramparts. The course of
the Putsch against Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the
Fall of 1993 has brought a revival of military power to the
former Soviet state. All of this weighs upon a German
military policy that attempts to reach out beyond the limits
of the past.
At the same time, however, the makers of U.S. strategy
should recognize the steps undertaken by their German
counterparts. The preceding chapters have interpreted in
detail the making of foreign and security policy in the past
three years. The death of Sgt. Alexander Arndt in Cambodia
this Fall is full evidence of this extraordinary change in
behavior and attitude toward fulfilling Germany's
burdensharing responsibility. Even though there is talk of
establishing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for
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Germany (as well as other Democratic states) , the idea of a
member residing without the ability to use its military
force in a similar fashion as the other permanent Security
Council members makes for an ill conceived policy. The
crisis of governance in Germany dictates that the FRG is not
ready to assume such a position until the debate is resolved
over peacekeeping and combat missions.
A knowledge of the intricacies of the policy process in
other countries is an essential requirement for the
effectiveness of U.S. policy. The makers of defense policy
in this country will often be disappointed if they expect
Germans to act like Americans or French or British without a
sense of the real limits of current German security policy.
At the same time, Germany continues to need U.S. leadership
in security affairs much because of the still conflicted
nature of defense and security policy in the FRG. This
thesis attests to this reality and its author looks forward
hopefully to a time when a democratic Germany can assume its
full role abroad on equal terms and in the ranks of the
world's democratic powers. The global community would
ultimately benefit from Germany's uninhibited military
contribution to peacekeeping, peace-making and peace
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